Infallibility

In general, exemption or immunity from liability to error or failure; in particular in

theological usage, the supernatural prerogative by which the Church of Christ is,

by a special Divine assistance, preserved from liability to error in her definitive

dogmatic teaching regarding matters of faith and morals. In this article the

subject will be treated under the following heads:

I. True Meaning of Infallibility

II. Proof of the Church's Infallibility

III. Organs of Infallibility

Ecumenical Councils

The Pope

Their Mutual Relations

IV. Scope and Object of Infallibility

V. What Teaching is Infallible?

I. TRUE MEANING OF INFALLIBILITY

It is well to begin by stating the ecclesiological truths that are assumed to be

established before the question of infallibility arises. It is assumed:

that Christ founded His Church as a visible and perfect society;

that He intended it to be absolutely universal and imposed upon all men a

solemn obligation actually to belong to it, unless inculpable ignorance

should excuse them;

that He wished this Church to be one, with a visible corporate unity of

faith, government, and worship; and that

in order to secure this threefold unity, He bestowed on the Apostles and

their legitimate successors in the hierarchy -- and on them exclusively --

the plenitude of teaching, governing, and liturgical powers with which He

wished this Church to be endowed.

And this being assumed, the question that concerns us is whether, and in what

way, and to what extent, Christ has made His Church to be infallible in the

exercise of her doctrinal authority.

It is only in connection with doctrinal authority as such that, practically speaking,

this question of infallibility arises; that is to say, when we speak of the Church's

infallibility we mean, at least primarily and principally, what is sometimes called

active as distinguished from passive infallibility. We mean in other words that the

Church is infallible in her objective definitive teaching regarding faith and morals,

not that believers are infallible in their subjective interpretation of her teaching.

This is obvious in the case of individuals, any one of whom may err in his

understanding of the Church's teaching; nor is the general or even unanimous

consent of the faithful in believing a distinct and independent organ of infallibility.

Such consent indeed, when it can be verified as apart, is of the highest value as

a proof of what has been, or may be, defined by the teaching authority, but,

except in so far as it is thus the subjective counterpart and complement of

objective authoritative teaching, it cannot be said to possess an absolutely

decisive dogmatic value. It will be best therefore to confine our attention to active

infallibility as such, as by so doing we shall avoid the confusion which is the sole

basis of many of the objections that are most persistently and most plausibly

urged against the doctrine of ecclesiastical infallibility.

Infallibility must be carefully distinguished both from Inspiration and from

Revelation.

Inspiration signifies a special positive Divine influence and assistance by reason

of which the human agent is not merely preserved from liability to error but is so

guided and controlled that what he says or writes is truly the word of God, that

God Himself is the principal author of the inspired utterance; but infallibility

merely implies exemption from liability to error. God is not the author of a merely

infallible, as He is of an inspired, utterance; the former remains a merely human

document.

Revelation, on the other hand, means the making known by God, supernaturally

of some truth hitherto unknown, or at least not vouched for by Divine authority;

whereas infallibility is concerned with the interpretation and effective safeguarding

of truths already revealed. Hence when we say, for example, that some doctrine

defined by the pope or by an ecumenical council is infallible, we mean merely

that its inerrancy is Divinely guaranteed according to the terms of Christ's

promise to His Church, not that either the pope or the Fathers of the Council are

inspired as were the writers of the Bible or that any new revelation is embodied in

their teaching.

It is well further to explain:

that infallibility means more than exemption from actual error; it means

exemption from the possibility of error;

that it does not require holiness of life, much less imply impeccability in

its organs; sinful and wicked men may be God's agents in defining

infallibly;

and finally that the validity of the Divine guarantee is independent of the

fallible arguments upon which a definitive decision may be based, and of

the possibly unworthy human motives that in cases of strife may appear

to have influenced the result. It is the definitive result itself, and it alone,

that is guaranteed to be infallible, not the preliminary stages by which it is

reached.

If God bestowed the gift of prophecy on Caiphas who condemned Christ (John

11:49-52; 17:14), surely He may bestow the lesser gift of infallibility even on

unworthy human agents. It is, therefore, a mere waste of time for opponents of

infallibility to try to create a prejudice against the Catholic claim by pointing out

the moral or intellectual shortcomings of popes or councils that have pronounced

definitive doctrinal decisions, or to try to show historically that such decisions in

certain cases were the seemingly natural and inevitable outcome of existing

conditions, moral, intellectual, and political. All that history may be fairly claimed

as witnessing to under either of these heads may freely be granted without the

substance of the Catholic claim being affected.

II. PROOF OF THE CHURCH'S INFALLIBILITY

That the Church is infallible in her definitions on faith and morals is itself a

Catholic dogma, which, although it was formulated ecumenically for the first time

in the Vatican Council, had been explicitly taught long before and had been

assumed from the very beginning without question down to the time of the

Protestant Reformation. The teaching of the Vatican Council is to be found in

Session III, cap. 4, where it is declared that "the doctrine of faith, which God has

revealed, has not been proposed as a philosophical discovery to be improved

upon by human talent, but has been committed as a Divine deposit to the

spouse of Christ, to be faithfully guarded and infallibly interpreted by her"; and in

Session IV, cap. 4, where it is defined that the Roman pontiff when he teaches

ex cathedra "enjoys, by reason of the Divine assistance promised to him in

blessed Peter, that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer wished His

Church to be endowed in defining doctrine regarding faith and morals". Even the

Vatican Council, it will be seen, only introduces the general dogma of the

Church's infallibility as distinct from that of the pope obliquely and indirectly,

following in this respect the traditional usage according to which the dogma is

assumed as an implicate of ecumenical magisterial authority. Instances of this

will be given below and from these it will appear that, though the word infallibility

as a technical term hardly occurs at all in the early councils or in the Fathers,

the thing signified by it was understood and believed in and acted upon from the

beginning. We shall confine our attention in this section to the general question,

reserving the doctrine of papal infallibility for special treatment. This arrangement

is adopted not because it is the best or most logical, but because it enables us

to travel a certain distance in the friendly company of those who cling to the

general doctrine of ecclesiastical infallibility while rejecting the papal claims.

Taking the evidence both scriptural and traditional as it actually stands, one may

fairly maintain that it proves papal infallibility in a simpler, more direct, and more

cogent way than it proves the general doctrine independently; and there can be

no doubt but that this is so if we accept as the alternative to papal infallibility the

vague and unworkable theory of ecumenical infallibility which most High-Church

Anglicans would substitute for Catholic teaching. Nor are the Eastern

schismatical Churches much better off than the Anglican in this respect, except

that each has retained a sort of virtual belief in its own infallibility, and that in

practice they have been more faithful in guarding the doctrines infallibly defined

by the early ecumenical councils. Yet certain Anglicans and all the Eastern

Orthodox agree with Catholics in maintaining thnt Christ promised infallibility to

the true Church, and we welcome their support as against the general Protestant

denial of this truth.

PROOF FROM SCRIPTURE

1. In order to prevent misconception and thereby to anticipate a common popular

objection which is wholly based on a misconception it should be premised that

when we appeal to the Scriptures for proof of the Church's infallible authority we

appeal to them merely as reliable historical sources, and abstract altogether from

their inspiration. Even considered as purely human documents they furnish us,

we maintain, with a trustworthy report of Christ's sayings and promises; and,

taking it to be a fact that Christ said what is attributed to Him in the Gospels, we

further maintain that Christ's promises to the Apostles and their successors in

the teaching office include the promise of such guidance and assistance as

clearly implies infallibility. Having thus used the Scriptures as mere historical

sources to prove that Christ endowed the Church with infallible teaching authority

it is no vicious circle, but a perfectly legitimate iogical procedure, to rely on the

Church's authority for proof of what writings are inspired.

2. Merely remarking for the present that the texts in which Christ promised

infallible guidance especially to Peter and his successors in the primacy mlght

be appealed to here as possessing an a fortiori value, it will suffice to consider

the classical texts usually employed in the general proof of the Church's

infallibility; and of these the principal are:

Matthew 28:18-20;

Matthew 16:18;

John 14, 15, and 16;

I Timothy 3:14-15; and

Acts 15:28 sq.

Matthew 28:18-20. In Matthew 28:18-20, we have Christ's solemn commission

to the Apostles delivered shortly before His Ascension: "All power is given to me

in heaven and in earth. Going therefore, teach ye all nations; baptizing them in

the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to

observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and behold I am with you

all days, even to the consummation of the world." In Mark 16:15-16, the same

commission is given more briefly with the added promise of salvation to believers

and the threat of damnation for unbelievers; "Go ye into the whole world, and

preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be

saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned."

Now it cannot be denied by anyone who admits that Christ established a visible

Church at all, and endowed it with any kind of effective teaching authority, that

this commission, with all it implies, was given not only to the Apostles personally

for their own lifetime, but to their successors to the end of time, "even to the

consummation of the world". And assuming that it was the omniscient Son of

God Who spoke these words, with a full and clear realization of the import which,

in conjunction with His other promises, they were calculated to convey to the

Apostles and to all simple and sincere believers to the end of time, the only

reasonable interpretation to put upon them is that they contain the promise of

infallible guidance in doctrinal teaching made to the Apostolic College in the first

instance and then to the hierarchical college that was to succeed it.

In the first place it was not without reason that Christ prefaced His commission

by appealing to the fullness of power He Himself had received: "All power is given

to me", etc. This is evidently intended to emphasize the extraordinary character

and extent of the authority He is communicating to His Church -- an authority, it

is implied, which He could not personally communicate were not He Himself

omnipotent. Hence the promise that follows cannot reasonably be understood of

ordinary natural providential guidance, but must refer to a very special

supernatural assistance.

In the next place there is question particularly in this passage of doctrinal

authority -- of authority to teach the Gospel to all men -- if Christ's promise to be

with the Apostles and their successors to the end of time in carrying out this

commission means that those whom they are to teach in His name and

according to the plenitude of the power He has given them are bound to receive

that teaching as if it were His own; in other words they are bound to accept it as

infallible. Otherwise the perennial assistance promised would not really be

efficacious for its purpose, and efficacious Divine assistance is what the

expression used is clearly intended to signify. Supposing, as we do, that Christ

actually delivered a definite body of revealed truth, to be taught to all men in all

ages, and to be guarded from change or corruption by the living voice of His

visible Church, it is idle to contend that this result could be accomplished

effectively -- in other words that His promise could be effectively fulfilled unless

that living voice can speak infallibly to every generation on any question that may

arise affecting the substance of Christ's teaching.

Without infallibility there could be no finality regarding any one of the great truths

which have been identified historically with the very essence of Christianity; and it

is only with those who believe in historical Christianity that the question need be

discussed. Take, for instance, the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation. If the

early Church was not infallible in her definitions regarding these truths, what

compelling reason can be alleged today against the right to revive the Sabellian,

or the Arian, or the Macedonian, or the Apollinarian, or the Nestorian, or the

Eutychian controversies, and to defend some interpretation of these mysteries

which the Church has condemned as heretical?

One may not appeal to the inspired authority of the Scriptures, since for the fact

of their inspiration the authority of the Church must be invoked, and unless she

be infallible in deciding this one would be free to question the inspiration of any of

the New Testament writings. Nor, abstracting from the question of inspiration,

can it be fairly maintained, in face of the facts of history, that the work of

interpreting scriptural teaching regarding these mysteries and several other

points of doctrine that have been identified with the substance of historical

Christianity is so easy as to do away with the need of a living voice to which, as

to the voice of Christ Himself, all are bound to submit.

Unity of Faith was intended by Christ to be one of the distinctive notes of His

Church, and the doctrinal authority He set up was intended by His Divine

guidance and assistance to be really effective in maintaining this unity; but the

history of the early heresies and of the Protestant sects proves clearly, what

might indeed have been anticipated a priori, that nothing less than an infallible

public authority capable of acting decisively whenever the need should rise and

pronouncing an absolutely final and irreformable judgment, is really efficient for

this purpose. Practically speaking the only alternative to infallibility is private

judgment, and this after some centuries of trial has been found to lead inevitably

to utter rationalism. If the early definitions of the Church were fallible, and

therefore reformable, perhaps those are right who say today that they ought to be

discarded as being actually erroneous or even pernicious, or at least that they

ought to be re-interpreted in a way that substantially changes their original

meaning; perhaps, indeed, there is no such thing as absolute truth in matters

religious! How, for example, is a Modernist who takes up this position to be met

except by insisting that definitive teaching is irreversible and unchangeable; that

it remains true in its original sense for all time; in other words that it is infallible?

For no one can reasonably hold that fallible doctrinal teaching is irreformable or

deny the right of later generations to question the correctness of earlier fallible

definitions and call for their revision or correction, or even for their total

abandonment.

From these considerations we are justified in concluding that if Christ really

intended His promise to be with His Church to be taken seriously, and if He was

truly the Son of God, omniscient and omnipotent, knowing history in advance and

able to control its course, then the Church is entitled to claim infallible doctrinal

authority. This conclusion is confirmed by considering the awful sanction by

which the Church's authority is supported: all who refuse to assent to her

teaching are threatened with eternal damnation. This proves the value Christ

Himself set upon His own teaching and upon the teaching of the Church

commissioned to teach in His name; religious indifferentism is here reprobated in

unmistakable terms.

Nor does such a sanction lose its significance in this connection because the

same penalty is threatened for disobedience to fallible disciplinary laws, or even

in some cases for refusing to assent to doctrinal teaching that is admittedly

fallible. Indeed, every mortal sin, according to Christ's teaching, is punishable

with eternal damnation. But if one believes in the objectivity of eternal and

immutable truth, he will find it difficult to reconcile with a worthy conception of the

Divine attributes a command under penalty of damnation to give unqualified and

irrevocable internal assent to a large body of professedly Divine doctrine the

whole of which is possibly false. Nor is this difficulty satisfactorily met, as some

have attempted to meet it, by calling attention to the fact that in the Catholic

system internal assent is sometimes demanded, under pain of grievous sin, to

doctrinal decisions that do not profess to be infallible. For, in the first place, the

assent to be given in such cases is recognized as being not irrevocable and

irreversible, like the assent required in the case of definitive and infallible

teaching, but merely provisional; and in the next place, internal assent is

obligatory only on those who can give it consistently with the claims of objective

truth on their conscience -- this conscience, it is assumed, being directed by a

spirit of generous loyalty to genuine Catholic principles.

To take a particular example, if Galileo who happened to be right while the

ecclesiastical tribunal which condemned him was wrong, had really possessed

convincing scientific evidence in favour of the heliocentric theory, he would have

been justified in refusing his internal assent to the opposite theory, provided that

in doing so he observed with thorough loyalty all the conditions involved in the

duty of external obedience. Finally it should be observed that fallible provisional

teaching, as such, derives its binding force principally from the fact that it

emanates from an authority which is competent, if need be, to convert it into

infallible definitive teaching. Without infallibility in the background it would be

difficult to establish theoretically the obligation of yielding internal assent to the

Church's provisional decisions.

Matthew 16:18. In Matthew 16:18, we have the promise that "the gates of hell

shall not prevail" against the Church that is to be built on the rock; and this also,

we maintain, implies the assurance of the Church's infallibility in the exercise of

her teaching office. Such a promise, of course, must be understood with

limitations according to the nature of the matter to which it is applied. As applied

to sanctity, for example, which is essentially a personal and individual affair, it

does not mean that every member of the Church or of her hierarchy is

necessarily a saint, but merely that the Church, as whole, will be conspicuous

among other things for the holiness of life of her members. As applied to

doctrine, however -- always assuming, as we do, that Christ delivered a body of

doctrine the preservation of which in its literal truth was to be one of the chief

duties of the Church -- it would be a mockery to contend that such a promise is

compatible with the supposition that the Church has possibly erred in perhaps

the bulk of her dogmatic definitions, and that throughout the whole of her history

she has been threatening men with eternal damnation in Christ's name for

refusing to believe doctrines that are probably false and were never taught by

Christ Himself. Could this be the case, would it not be clear that the gates of hell

can prevail and probably have prevailed most signally against the Church?

John 14-16. In Christ's discourse to the Apostles at the Last Supper several

passages occur which clearly imply the promise of infallibility: "I will ask the

Father, and he shall give you another Paraclete, that he may abide with you

forever. The spirit of truth . . . he shall abide with you, and shall be in you" (John

14:16, 17). "But the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my

name, he will teach you all things, and bring all things to your mind, whatsoever I

shall have said to you" (ibid. 26). "But when he, the spirit of truth, is come, he

will teach you all truth (John 16:13). And the same promise is renewed

immediately before the Ascension (Acts 1:8). Now what does the promise of this

perennial and efficacious presence and assistance of the Holy Ghost, the Spirit

of truth, mean in connection with doctrinal authority, except that the Third Person

of the Blessed Trinity is made responsible for what the Apostles and their

successors may define to be part of Christ's teaching? But insofar as the Holy

Ghost is responsible for Church teaching, that teaching is necessarily infallible:

what the Spirit of truth guarantees cannot be false.

I Timothy 3:15. In I Timothy 3:15, St. Paul speaks of "the house of God, which

is the church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth"; and this

description would be something worse than mere exaggeration if it had been

intended to apply to a fallible Church; it would be a false and misleading

description. That St. Paul, however, meant it to be taken for sober and literal

truth is abundantly proved by what he insists upon so strongly elsewhere,

namely, the strictly Divine authority of the Gospel which he and the other

Apostles preached, and which it was the mission of their successors to go on

preaching without change or corruption to the end of time. "When you had

received of us", he writes to the Thessalonians, "the word of the hearing of God,

you received it not as the word of men, but (as it is indeed) the word of God, who

worketh in you that have believed" (I Thessalonians 2:13). The Gospel, he tells

the Corinthians, is intended to bring "into captivity every understanding unto the

obedience of Christ" (II Corinthians 10:5). Indeed, so fixed and irreformable is the

doctrine that has been taught that the Galatians (1:8) are warned to

anathematize any one, even an angel from heaven, who should preach to them a

Gospel other than that which St. Paul had preached. Nor was this attitude --

which is intelligible only on the supposition that the Apostolic College was

infallible -- peculiar to St. Paul. The other Apostles and apostolic writers were

equally strong in anathematizing those who preached another Christianity than

that which the Apostles had preached (cf. II Peter 2:1 sqq.; I John 4:1 sqq.; II

John 7 sqq.; Jude 4); and St. Paul makes it clear that it was not to any personal

or private views of his own that he claimed to make every understanding captive,

but to the Gospel which Christ had delivered to the Apostolic body. When his

own authority as an Apostle was challenged, his defense was that he had seen

the risen Saviour and received his mission directly from Him, and that his Gospel

was in complete agreement with that of the other Apostles (see, v.g., Galatians

2:2-9).

Acts 15:28. Finally, the consciousness of corporate infallibility is clearly signified

in the expression used by the assembled Apostles in the decree of the Council

of Jerusalem: "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further

burden upon you", etc. (Acts 15:28). It is true that the specific points here dealt

with are chiefly disciplinary rather than dogmatic, and that no claim to infallibility

is made in regard to purely disciplinary questions as such; but behind, and

independent of, disciplinary details there was the broad and most important

dogmatic question to be decided, whether Christians, according to Christ's

teaching, were bound to observe the Old Law in its integrity, as orthodox Jews of

the time observed it. This was the main issue at stake, and in deciding it the

Apostles claimed to speak in the name and with the authority of the Holy Ghost.

Would men who did not believe that Christ's promises assured them of an

infallible Divine guidance have presumed to speak in this way? And could they, in

so believing, have misunderstood the Master's meaning?

PROOF FROM TRADITION

If, during the early centuries, there was no explicit and formal discussion

regarding ecclesiastical infallibility as such, yet the Church, in her corporate

capacity, after the example of the Apostles at Jerusalem, always acted on the

assumption that she was infallible in doctrinal matters and all the great orthodox

teachers believed that she was so. Those who presumed, on whatever grounds,

to contradict the Church's teaching were treated as representatives of Antichrist

(cf. I John 2:18 sq.), and were excommunicated and anathematized.

It is clear from the letters of St. Ignatius of Antioch how intolerant he was

of error, and how firmly convinced that the episcopal body was the Divinely

ordained and Divinely guided organ of truth; nor can any student of early

Christian literature deny that, where Divine guidance is claimed in

doctrinal matters, infallibility is implied.

So intolerant of error was St. Polycarp that, as the story goes, when he

met Marcion on the street in Rome, he did not hesitate to denounce the

heretic to his face as "the firstborn of Satan". This incident, whether it be

true or not, is at any rate thoroughly in keeping with the spirit of the age

and such a spirit is incompatible with belief in a fallible Church.

St. Irenaeus, who in the disciplinary Paschal question favoured

compromise for the sake of peace, took an altogether different attitude in

the doctrinal controversy with the Gnostics; and the great principle on

which he mainly relies in refuting the heretics is the principle of a living

ecclesiastical authority for which he virtually claims infallibility. For

example he says: "Where the Church is, there also is the Spirit of God,

and where the Spirit of God is there is the Church, and every grace: for the

Spirit is truth" (Adv. Haer. III, xxiv, 1); and again, Where the charismata of

the Lord are given, there must we seek the truth, i.e. with those to whom

belongs the ecclesiastical succession from the Apostles, and the

unadulterated and incorruptible word. It is they who . . . are the guardians

of our faith . . . and securely [sine periculo] expound the Scriptures to us"

(op. cit., IV xxvi, 5).

Tertullian, writing from the Catholic standpoint, ridicules the suggestion

that the universal teaching of the Church can be wrong: "Suppose now

that all [the Churches] have erred . . . [This would mean that] the Holy

Spirit has not watched over any of them so as to guide it into the truth,

although He was sent by Christ, and asked from the Father for this very

purpose -- that He might be the teacher of truth" (doctor veritatis -- "De

Praescript", xxxvi, in P.L., II, 49).

St. Cyprian compares the Church to an incorruptible virgin: Adulterari non

potest sponsa Christi, incorrupta est et pudica (De unitate eccl.).

It is needless to go on multiplying citations, since the broad fact is indisputable

that in the ante-Nicene, no less than in the post-Nicene, period all orthodox

Christians attributed to the corporate voice of the Church, speaking through the

body of bishops in union with their head and centre, all the fullness of doctrinal

authority which the Apostles themselves had possessed; and to question the

infallibility of that authority would have been considered equivalent to questioning

God's veracity and fidelity. It was for this reason that during the first three

centuries the concurrent action of the bishops dispersed throughout the world

proved to be effective in securing the condemnation and exclusion of certain

heresies and maintaining Gospel truth in its purity; and when from the fourth

century onwards it was found expedient to assemble ecumenical councils, after

the example of the Apostles at Jerusalem, it was for the same reason that the

doctrinal decision of these councils were held to be absolutely final and

irreformable. Even the heretics, for the most part recognized this principle in

theory; and if in fact they often refused to submit, they did so as a rule on the

ground that this or that council was not really ecumenical, that it did not truly

express the corporate voice of the Church, and was not, therefore, infallible. This

will not be denied by anyone who is familiar with the history of the doctrinal

controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries, and within the limits of this article

we cannot do more than call attention to the broad conclusion in proof of which it

would be easy to cite a great number of particular facts and testimonies.

OBJECTIONS ALLEGED

Several of the objections usually urged against ecclesiastical infallibility have

been anticipated in the preceding sections; but some others deserve a passing

notice here.

1. It has been urged that neither a fallible individual nor a collection of fallible

individuals can constitute an infallible organ. This is quite true in reference to

natural knowledge and would be also true as applied to Church authority if

Christianity were assumed to be a mere product of natural reason. But we set

out from an entirely different standpoint. We assume as antecedently and

independently established that God can supernaturally guide and enlighten men,

individually or collectively, in such a way that, notwithstanding the natural

fallibility of human intelligence, they may speak and may be known with certainty

to speak in His name and with His authority, so that their utterance may be not

merely infallible but inspired. And it is only with those who accept this standpoint

that the question of the Church's infallibility can be profitably discussed.

2. Again, it is said that even those who accept the supernatural viewpoint must

ultimately fall back on fallible human reasoning in attempting to prove infallibility;

that behind any conclusion that is proposed on so-called infallible authority there

always lurks a premise which cannot claim for itself more than a merely human

and fallible certainty; and that, since the strength of a conclusion is no greater

than that of its weaker premise, the principle of infallibility is a useless as well as

an illogical importation into Christian theology. In reply it is to be observed that

this argument, if valid, would prove very much more than it is here introduced to

prove; that it would indeed undermine the very foundations of Christian faith. For

example, on purely rational grounds I have only moral certainty that God Himself

is infallible or that Christ was the infallible mediator of a Divine Revelation; yet if I

am to give a rational defense of my faith, even in mysteries which I do not

comprehend, I must do so by appealing to the infallibility of God and of Christ.

But according to the logic of the objection this appeal would be futile and the

assent of faith considered as a rational act would be no firmer or more secure

than natural human knowledge. The truth is that the inferential process here and

in the case of ecclesiastical infallibility transcends the rule of formal logic that is

alleged. Assent is given not to the logical force of the syllogism, but directly to

the authority which the inference serves to introduce; and this holds good in a

measure even when there is question of mere fallible authority. Once we come to

believe in and rely upon authority we can afford to overlook the means by which

we were brought to accept it, just as a man who has reached a solid standing

place where he wishes to remain no longer relies on the frail ladder by which he

mounted. It cannot be said that there is any essential difference in this respect

between Divine and ecclesiastical infallibility. The latter of course is only a

means by which we are put under subjection to the former in regard to a body of

truth once revealed and to be believed by all men to the end of time, and no one

can fairly deny that it is useful, not to say necessary, for that purpose. Its

alternative is private judgment, and history has shown to what results this

alternative inevitably leads.

3. Again, it is urged that the kind of submission demanded by infallible authority

is incompatible with the rights of reason and of legitimate inquiry and

speculation, and tends to give to one's faith in his Creed a dry, formal, proud, and

intolerant character which contrasts unfavourably with the warmhearted, humble,

and tolerant faith of the man who believes on conviction after free personal

inquiry. In reply it is sufficient to say that submission to infallible authority implies

no abdication of reason, nor does it impose any undue check on the believer's

freedom to pursue inquiry and speculation. Were it so, how could one believe in

revealed doctrine at all without being accused, as unbelievers do accuse

Christians, of committing intellectual suicide? If one believes in revelation at all

one does so in deference to God's authority an authority that is surely infallible;

and so far as the principle of the objection is concerned there is no difference

between ecclesiastical and Divine infallibility. It is somewhat surprising, therefore,

that professing Christians should recur to such an argument, which, if

consistently urged, would be fatal to their own position. And as regards freedom

of inquiry and speculation in reference to revealed doctrines themselves, it should

be observed that true freedom in this as in other matters does not mean

unbridled licence. Really effective authoritative control is always necessary to

prevent liberty from degenerating into anarchy, and in the sphere of Christian

doctrine -- we are arguing only with those who admit that Christ delivered a body

of doctrine that was to be held as eternally true -- from the very nature of the

case, the only effective barrier against Rationalism -- the equivalent of political

anarchy -- is an infallible ecclesiastical authority. This authority therefore, by its

decisions merely curtails personal freedom of inquiry in religious matters in the

same way, and by an equally valid title, as the supreme authority in the State,

restricts the liberty of private citizens.

Moreover, as in a well ordered state there remains within the law a large margin

for the exercise of personal freedom, so in the Church there is a very extensive

domain which is given over to theological speculation; and even in regard to

doctrines that have been infallibly defined there is always room for further inquiry

so as the better to understand, explain, defend, and expand them. The only thing

one may not do is to deny or change them. Then, in reply to the charge of

intolerance, it may be said that if this be taken to mean an honest and sincere

repudiation of Liberalism and Rationalism, infallibilists must plead guilty to the

charge; but in doing so they are in good company. Christ Himself was intolerant

in this sense; so were His Apostles; and so were all the great champions of

historical Christianity in every age. Finally it is altogether untrue, as every

Catholic knows and feels, that faith which allows itself to be guided by infallible

ecclesiastical authority is less intimately personal or less genuine in any way

than faith based on private judgment. If this docile loyalty to Divine authority

which true faith implies means anything, it means that one must listen to the

voice of those whom God has expressly appointed to teach in His name, rather

than to one's own private judgment deciding what God's teaching ought to be. For

to this, in final analysis, the issue is reduced; and he who chooses to make

himself, instead of the authority which God has instituted, the final arbiter in

matters of faith is far from possessing the true spirit of faith, which is the

foundation of charity and of the whole supernatural life.

4. Again it is urged by our opponents that infallibility as exercised by the Catholic

Church has shown itself to be a failure, since, in the first place, it has not

prevented schisms and heresies in the Christian body, and, in the second place,

has not attempted to settle for Catholics themselves many important questions,

the final settlement of which would be a great relief to believers by freeing them

from anxious and distressing doubts. In reply to the first point it is enough to say

that the purpose for which Christ endowed the Church with infallibility was not to

prevent the occurrence of schisms and heresies, which He foresaw and foretold,

but to take away all justification for their occurrence; men were left free to disrupt

the unity of Faith inculcated by Christ in the same way as they were left free to

disobey any other commandment, but heresy was intended to be no more

justifiable objectively than homicide or adultery. To reply to the second point we

would observe that it seems highly inconsistent for the same objector to blame

Catholics in one breath for having too much defined doctrine in their Creed and, in

the next breath, to find fault with them for having too little. Either part of the

accusation, in so far as it is founded, is a sufficient answer to the other.

Catholics as a matter of fact do not feel in any way distressed either by the

restrictions, on the one hand, which infallible definitions impose or, on the other

hand, by the liberty as to non-defined matters which they enjoy, and they can

afford to decline the services of an opponent who is determined at all costs to

invent a grievance for them. The objection is based on a mechanical conception

of the function of infallible authority, as if this were fairly comparable, for example,

to a clock which is supposed to tell us unerringly not only the large divisions of

time such as the hours, but also, if it is to be useful as a timekeeper, the

minutes and even the seconds. Even if we admit the propriety of the illustration, it

is obvious that a clock which records the hours correctly, without indicating the

smaller fractions of time, is a very useful instrument, and that it would be foolish

to refuse to follow it because it is not provided with a minute or a second hand on

the dial. But it is perhaps best to avoid such mechanical illustrations altogether.

The Catholic believer who has real faith in the efficiency of Christ's promises will

not doubt but that the Holy Ghost Who abides in the Church, and Whose

assistance guarantees the infallibility of her definitions, will also provide that any

definition that may be necessary or expedient for the safeguarding of Christ's

teaching will be given at the opportune moment, and that such definable

questions as are left undefined may, for the time being at least, be allowed to

remain so without detriment to the faith or morals of the faithful.

5. Finally, it is objected that the acceptance of ecclesiastical infallibility is

incompatible with the theory of doctrinal development which Catholics commonly

admit. But so far is this from being true that it is impossible to frame any theory

of development, consistent with Catholic principles, in which authority is not

recognized as a guiding and controlling factor. For development in the Catholic

sense does not mean that the Church ever changes her definitive teaching, but

merely that as time goes on and human science advances, her teaching is more

deeply analyzed, more fully comprehended, and more perfectly coordinated and

explained in itself and in its bearings on other departments of knowledge. It is

only on the false supposition that development means change in definitive

teaching that the objection has any real force. We have confined our attention to

what we may describe as the rational objections against the Catholic doctrine of

infallibility, omitting all mention of the interminable exegetical difficulties which

Protestant theologians have raised against the Catholic interpretation of Christ's

promises to His Church. The necessity for noticing these latter has been done

away with by the growth of Rationalism, the logical successor of old-time

Protestantism. If the infallible Divine authority of Christ, and the historicity of His

promises to which we have appealed be admitted, there is no reasonable escape

from the conclusion which the Catholic Church has drawn from those promises.

III. ORGANS OF INFALLIBILITY

Having established the general doctrine of the Church's infallibility, we naturally

proceed to ask what are the organs through which the voice of infallible authority

makes itself heard. We have already seen that it is only in the episcopal body

which has succeeded to the college of Apostles that infallible authority resides,

and that it is possible for the authority to be effectively exercised by this body,

dispersed throughout the world, but united in bonds of communion with Peter's

successor, who is its visible head and centre. During the interval from the council

of the Apostles at Jerusalem to that of their successors at Nicaea this ordinary

everyday exercise of episcopal authority was found to be sufficiently effective for

the needs of the time, but when a crisis like the Arian heresy arose, its

effectiveness was discovered to be inadequate, as was indeed inevitable by

reason of the practical difficulty of verifying that fact of moral unanimity, once any

considerable volume of dissent had to be faced. And while for subsequent ages

down to our own day it continues to be theoretically true that the Church may, by

the exercise of this ordinary teaching authority arrive at a final and infallible

decision regarding doctrinal questions, it is true at the same time that in practice

it may be impossible to prove conclusively that such unanimity as may exist has

a strictly definitive value in any particular case, unless it has been embodied in a

decree of an ecumenical council, or in the ex cathedra teaching of the pope, or,

at least, in some definite formula such as the Athanasian Creed. Hence, for

practical purposes and in so far as the special question of infallibility is

concerned, we may neglect the so called magisterium ordinarium ("ordinary

magisterium") and confine our attention to ecumenical councils and the pope.

A. Ecumenical Councils

1. An ecumenical or general, as distinguished from a particular or provincial

council, is an assembly of bishops which juridically represents the universal

Church as hierarchically constituted by Christ; and, since the primacy of Peter

and of his successor, the pope, is an essential feature in the hierarchical

constitution of the Church, it follows that there can be no such thing as an

ecumenical council independent of, or in opposition to, the pope. No body can

perform a strictly corporate function validly without the consent and co-operation

of its head. Hence:

the right to summon an ecumenical council belongs properly to the pope

alone, though by his express or presumed consent given ante or post

factum, the summons may be issued, as in the case of most of the early

councils, in the name of the civil authority. For ecumenicity in the

adequate sense all the bishops of the world in communion with the Holy

See should be summoned, but it is not required that all or even a majority

should be present.

As regards the conduct of the deliberations, the right of presidency, of

course, belongs to the pope or his representative; while as regards the

decisions arrived at unanimity is not required.

Finally, papal approbation is required to give ecumenical value and

authority to conciliar decrees, and this must be subsequent to conciliar

action, unless the pope, by his personal presence and conscience, has

already given his official ratification (for details see GENERAL COUNCILS).

2. That an ecumenical council which satisfies the conditions above stated is an

organ of infallibility will not be denied by anyone who admits that the Church is

endowed with infallible doctrinal authority. How, if not through such an organ,

could infallible authority effectively express itself, unless indeed through the

pope? If Christ promised to be present with even two or three of His disciples

gathered together in His name (Matthew 18:20), a fortiori He will be present

efficaciously in a representative assembly of His authorized teachers; and the

Paraclete whom He promised will be present, so that whatever the council

defines may be prefaced with the Apostolic formula, "it has seemed good to the

Holy Ghost and to us." And this is the view which the councils held regarding

their own authority and upon which the defender of orthodoxy insisted. The

councils insisted on their definitions being accepted under pain of anathema,

while St. Athanasius, for example, says that "the word of the Lord pronounced by

the ecumenical synod of Nicaea stands for ever" (Ep. ad Afros, n. 2) and St. Leo

the Great proves the unchangeable character of definitive conciliar teaching on

the ground that God has irrevocably confirmed its truth "universae fraternitatis

irretractabili firmavit assensu" (Ep. 120, 1).

3. It remains to be observed, in opposition to the theory of conciliar infallibility

usually defended by High Church Anglicans that once the requisite papal

confirmation has been given the doctrinal decisions of an ecumenical council

become infallible and irreformable; there is no need to wait perhaps hundreds of

years for the unanimous acceptance and approbation of the whole Christian

world. Such a theory really amounts to a denial of conciliar infallibility, and sets

up in the final court of appeal an altogether vague and ineffective tribunal. If the

theory be true, were not the Arians perfectly justified in their prolonged struggle

to reverse Nicaea, and has not the persistent refusal of the Nestorians down to

our own day to accept Ephesus and of the Monophysites to accept Chalcedon

been sufficient to defeat the ratification of those councils? No workable rule can

be given for deciding when such subsequent ratification as this theory requires

becomes effective and even if this could be done in the case of some of the

earlier councils whose definitions are received by the Anglicans, it would still be

true that since the Photian schism it has been practically impossible to secure

any such consensus as is required -- in other words that the working of infallible

authority, the purpose of which is to teach every generation, has been suspended

since the ninth century, and that Christ's promises to His Church have been

falsified. It is consoling, no doubt, to cling to the abstract doctrine of an infallible

authority but if one adopts a theory which represents that authority as unable to

fulfil its appointed task during the greater part of the Church's life, it is not easy to

see how this consolatory belief is anything more than a delusion.

B. The Pope

EXPLANATION OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY

The Vatican Council has defined as "a divinely revealed dogma" that "the Roman

Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra -- that is, when in the exercise of his office

as pastor and teacher of all Christians he defines, by virtue of his supreme

Apostolic authority, a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the whole Church --

is, by reason of the Divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter,

possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer wished His Church

to be endowed in defining doctrines of faith and morals; and consequently that

such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of their own nature (ex

sese) and not by reason of the Church's consent" (Densinger no. 1839 -- old no.

1680). For the correct understanding of this definition it is to be noted that:

what is claimed for the pope is infallibility merely, not impeccability or

inspiration (see above under I).

the infallibility claimed for the pope is the same in its nature, scope, and

extent as that which the Church as a whole possesses; his ex cathedra

teaching does not have to be ratified by the Church's in order to be

infallible.

infallibility is not attributed to every doctrinal act of the pope, but only to

his ex cathedra teaching; and the conditions required for ex cathedra

teaching are mentioned in the Vatican decree:

The pontiff must teach in his public and official capacity as pastor

and doctor of all Christians, not merely in his private capacity as a

theologian, preacher ar allocutionist, nor in his capacity as a

temporal prince or as a mere ordinary of the Diocese of Rome. It

must be clear that he speaks as spiritual head of the Church

universal.

Then it is only when, in this capacity, he teaches some doctrine of

faith or morals that he is infallible (see below, IV).

Further it must be sufficiently evident that he intends to teach with

all the fullness and finality of his supreme Apostolic authority, in

other words that he wishes to determine some point of doctrine in

an absolutely final and irrevocable way, or to define it in the

technical sense (see DEFINITION). These are well-recognized

formulas by means of which the defining intention may be

manifested.

Finally for an ex cathedra decision it must be clear that the pope

intends to bind the whole Church. To demand internal assent from

all the faithful to his teaching under pain of incurring spiritual

shipwreck (naufragium fidei) according to the expression used by

Pius IX in defining the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed

Virgin. Theoretically, this intention might be made sufficiently clear

in a papal decision which is addressed only to a particular Church;

but in present day conditions, when it is so easy to communicate

with the most distant parts of the earth and to secure a literally

universal promulgation of papal acts, the presumption is that

unless the pope formally addresses the whole Church in the

recognized official way, he does not intend his doctrinal teaching to

be held by all the faithful as ex cathedra and infallible.

It should be observed in conclusion that papal infallibility is a personal and

incommunicable charisma, which is not shared by any pontifical tribunal. It was

promised directly to Peter, and to each of Peter's successors in the primacy, but

not as a prerogative the exercise of which could be delegated to others. Hence

doctrinal decisions or instructions issued by the Roman congregations, even

when approved by the pope in the ordinary way, have no claim to be considered

infallible. To be infallible they must be issued by the pope himself in his own

name according to the conditions already mentioned as requisite for ex cathedra

teaching.

PROOF OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY FROM HOLY SCRIPTURE

From Holy Scripture, as already stated, the special proof of the pope's infallibility

is, if anything, stronger and clearer than the general proof of the infallibility of the

Church as a whole, just as the proof of his primacy is stronger and clearer than

any proof that can be advanced independently for the Apostolic authority of the

episcopate.

Matthew 16:18. "Thou art Peter (Kepha)", said Christ, "and upon this rock

(kepha) I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it"

(Matthew 16:18). Various attempts have been made by opponents of the papal

claims to get rid of the only obvious and natural meaning of these words,

according to which Peter is to be the rock-foundation of the Church, and the

source of its indefectibility against the gates of hell. It has been suggested, for

example, that "this rock" is Christ Himself or that it is Peter's faith (typifying the

faith of future believers), not his person and office, on which the Church is to be

built. But these and similar interpretations simply destroy the logical coherency

of Christ's statement and are excluded by the Greek and Latin texts, in which a

kind of play upon the words Petros (Petrus) and petra is clearly intended, and

still more forcibly by the original Aramaic which Christ spoke, and in which the

same word Kêpha must have been used in both clauses. And granting, as the

best modern non-Catholic commentators grant, that this text of St. Matthew

contains the promise that St. Peter was to be the rock-foundation of the Church,

it is impossible to deny that Peter's successors in the primacy are heirs to this

promise -- unless, indeed, one is willing to admit the principle, which would be

altogether subversive of the hierarchial system, that the authority bestowed by

Christ on the Apostles was not intended to be transmitted to their successors,

and to abide in the Church permanently. Peter's headship was as much

emphasized by Christ Himself, and was as clearly recognized in the infant

Church, as was the enduring authority of the episcopal body; and it is a puzzle

which the Catholic finds it hard to solve, how those who deny that the supreme

authority of Peter's successor is an essential factor in the constitution of the

Church can consistently maintain the Divine authority of the episcopate. Now, as

we have already seen, doctrinal indefectibility is certainly implied in Christ's

promise that the gates of hell shall not prevail against His Church, and cannot be

effectively secured without doctrinal infallibility; so that if Christ's promise means

anything -- if Peter's successor is in any true sense the foundation and source of

the Church's indefectibility -- he must by virtue of this office be also an organ of

ecclesiastical infallibility. The metaphor used clearly implies that it was the

rock-foundation which was to give stability to the superstructure, not the

superstructure to the rock.

Nor can it be said that this argument fails by proving too much -- by proving, that

is, that the pope should be impeccable, or at least that he should be a saint,

since, if the Church must be holy in order to overcome the gates of hell, the

example and inspiration of holiness ought to be given by him who is the visible

foundation of the Church's indefectibility. From the very nature of the case a

distinction must be made between sanctity or impeccability, and infallible

doctrinal authority. Personal sanctity is essentially incommunicable as between

men, and cannot affect others except in fallible and indirect ways, as by prayer

or example; but doctrinal teaching which is accepted as infallible is capable of

securing that certainty and consequent unity of Faith by which, as well as by

other bonds, the members of Christ's visible Church were to be "compacted and

fitly joined together" (Ephesians 4:16). It is true, of course, that infallible

teaching, especially on moral questions, helps to promote sanctity among those

who accept, but no one will seriously suggest that, if Christ had made the pope

impeccable as well as infallible, He would thereby have provided for the personal

sanctity of individual believers any more efficiently than, on Catholic principles,

He has actually done.

Luke 22:31-32. Here Christ says to St. Peter and to his successors in the

primacy: "Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift

you as wheat: But I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not: and thou, being

once converted, confirm thy brethren." This special prayer of Christ was for Peter

alone in his capacity as head of the Church, as is clear from the text and

context; and since we cannot doubt the efficacy of Christ's prayer, it followed that

to St. Peter and his successors the office was personally committed of

authoritatively confirming the brethren -- other bishops, and believers generally --

in the faith; and this implies infallibility.

John 21:15-17. Here we have the record of Christ's thrice-repeated demand for a

confession of Peter's love and the thrice-repeated commission to feed the lambs

and the sheep:

When therefore they had dined, Jesus said to Simon Peter: Simon,

son of John, do you love me more than these? He said to him:

Yes, Lord, you know that I love you. He said to him: Feed my

lambs. He said to him again: Simon, son of John, do you love me?

He said to him: Yes, Lord, you know that I love you. He said to

him: Feed my lambs. He said to him the third time: Simon, son of

John, do you love me? Peter was grieved, because he had said to

him the third time: Do you love me? And he said to him: Lord, you

know all things: you know that I love you. He said to him: Feed my

sheep.

Here the complete and supreme pastoral charge of the whole of Christ's flock --

sheep as well as lambs -- is given to St. Peter and his successors, and in this is

undoubtedly comprised supreme doctrinal authority. But, as we have already

seen, doctrinal authority in tbe Church cannot be really effective in securing the

unity of faith intended by Christ, unless in the last resort it is infallible. It is futile

to contend, as non Catholics have often done, that this passage is merely a

record of Peter's restoration to his personal share in the collective Apostolic

authority, which he had forfeited by his triple denial. It is quite probable that the

reason why Christ demanded the triple confession of love was as a set-off to the

triple denial; but if Christ's words in this and in the other passages quoted mean

anything, and if they are to be understood in the same obvious and natural way in

which defenders of the Divine authority of the episcopate understand the words

elsewhere addressed to the Apostles collectively, there is no denying that the

Petrine and papal claims are more clearly supported by the Gospels than are

those of a monarchical episcopate. It is equally futile to contend that these

promises were made, and this power given, to Peter merely as the representative

oE the Apostolic college: in the texts of the Gospel, Peter is individually singled

out and addressed with particular emphasis, so that, unless by denying with the

rationalist the genuineness of Christ's words, there is no logical escape from the

Catholic position. Furthermore, it is clear from such evidence as the Acts of the

Apostles supply, that Peter's supremacy was recognized in the infant Church

(see PRIMACY) and if this supremacy was intended to be efficacious for the

purpose for which it was instituted, it must have included the prerogative of

doctrinal infallibility.

PROOF OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY FROM TRADITION

One need not expect to find in the early centuries a formal and explicit

recognition throughout the Church either of the primacy or of the infallibility of the

pope in the terms in which these doctrines are defined by the Vatican Council.

But the fact cannot be denied that from the beginning there was a widespread

acknowledgment by other churches of some kind of supreme authority in the

Roman pontiff in regard not only to disciplinary but also to doctrinal affairs. This

is clear for example, from:

Clement's Letter to the Corinthians at the end of the first century,

the way in which, shortly afterwards, Ignatius of Antioch addresses the

Roman Church;

the conduct of Pope Victor in the latter half of the second century, in

connection with the paschal controversy;

the teaching of St. Irenaeus, who lays it down as a practical rule that

conformity with Rome is a sufficient proof of Apostolicity of doctrine

against the heretics (Adv. Haer., III, iii);

the correspondence between Pope Dionysius and his namesake at

Alexandria in the second half of the third century;

and from many other facts that might be mentioned (see PRIMACY).

Even heretics recognized something special in the doctrinal authority of the

pope, and some of them, like Marcion in the second century and Pelagius and

Caelestius in the first quarter of the fifth, appealed to Rome in the hope of

obtaining a reversal of their condemnation by provincial bishops or synods. And

in the age of the councils, from Nicaea onwards, there is a sufficiently explicit

and formal acknowledgment of the doctrinal supremacy of the Bishop of Rome.

St. Augustine, for example, voices the prevailing Catholic sentiment when

in reference to the Pelagian affair he declares, in a sermon delivered at

Carthage after the receipt of Pope Innocent's letter, confirming the decrees

of the Council of Carthage: "Rome's reply has come: the case is closed"

(Inde etiam rescripta venerunt: causa finita est. Serm. 131, c.x);

and again when in reference to the same subject he insists that "all doubt

bas been removed by the letter of Pope Innocent of blessed memory" (C.

Duas Epp. Pelag., II, iii, 5).

And what is still more important, is the explicit recognition in formal terms, by

councils which are admitted to be ecumenical, of the finality, and by implication

the infallibility of papal teaching.

Thus the Fathers of Ephesus (431) declare that they "are compelled" to

condemn the heresy of Nestorius "by the sacred canons and by the letter

of our holy father and co-minister, Celestine the Bishop of Rome."

Twenty years later (451) the Fathers of Chalcedon, after hearing Leo's

letter read, make themselves responsible for the statement: "so do we all

believe . . . Peter has spoken through Leo."

More than two centuries later, at the Third Council of Constantinople

(680-681), the same formula is repeated: "Peter has spoken through

Agatho."

After the lapse of still two other centuries, and shortly before the Photian

schism, the profession of faith drawn up by Pope Hormisdas was

accepted by the Fourth Council of Constantinople (869-870), and in this

profession, it is stated that, by virtue of Christ's promise: "Thou art Peter,

etc."; "the Catholic religion is preserved inviolable in the Apostolic See."

Finally the reunion Council of Florence (1438-1445), repeating what had

been substantially contained in the profession of faith of Michael

Palaeologus approved by the Second Council of Lyons (1274), defined

"that the holy Apostolic see and the Roman pontiff holds the primacy over

the whole world; and that the Roman pontiff himself is the successor of

the blessed Peter Prince of the Apostles and the true Vicar of Christ, and

the head of the whole Church, and the father and teacher of all Christians,

and that to him in blessed Peter the full power of feeding, ruling and

governing the universal Church was given by our Lord Jesus Christ, and

this is also recognized in the acts of the ecumenical council and in the

sacred canons (quemadmodum etiam . . . continetur.

Thus it is clear that the Vatican Council introduced no new doctrine when it

defined the infallibility of the pope, but merely re-asserted what had been

implicitly admitted and acted upon from the beginning and had even been

explicitly proclaimed and in equivalent terms by more than one of the early

ecumenical councils. Until the Photian Schism in the East and the Gallican

movement in the West there was no formal denial of papal supremacy, or of

papal infallibility as an adjunct of supreme doctrinal authority, while the instances

of their formal acknowledgment that have been referred to in the early centuries

are but a few out of the multitude that might be quoted.

OBJECTIONS ALLEGED

The only noteworthy objections against papal infallibility, as distinct from the

infallibility of the Church at large, are based on certain historical instances in

which it is alleged that certain popes in the ex cathedra exercise of their office

have actually taught heresy and condemned as heretical what has afterwards

turned out to be true. The chief instances usually appealed to are those of Popes

Liberius, Honorius, and Vigilius in the early centuries, and the Galileo affair at the

beginning of the seventeenth century.

Pope Liberius. Liberius, it is alleged, subscribed an Arian or Semi-Arian creed

drawn up by the Council of Sirmium and anathematized St. Athanasius, the great

champion of Nicaea, as a heretic. But even if this were an accurate statement of

historical fact, it is a very inadequate statement. The all-important circumstance

should be added that the pope so acted under pressure of a very cruel coercion,

which at once deprives his action of any claim to be considered ex cathedra, and

that he himself, as soon as he had recovered his liberty, made amends for the

moral weakness he had been guilty of. This is a quite satisfactory answer to the

objection, but it ought to be added that there is no evidence whatever that

Liberius ever anathematized St. Athanasius expressly as a heretic, and that it

remains a moot point which of three or four Sirmian creeds he subscribed, two of

which contained no positive assertion of heretical doctrine and were defective

merely for the negative reason that they failed to insist on the full definition of

Nicaea.

Pope Honorius. The charge against Pope Honorius is a double one: that, when

appealed to in the Monothelite controversy, he actually taught the Monothelite

heresy in his two letters to Sergius; and that he was condemned as a heretic by

the Sixth Ecumenical Council, the decrees of which were approved by Leo II. But

in the first place it is quite clear from the tone and terms of these letters that, so

far from intending to give any final, or ex cathedra, decision on the doctrinal

question at issue, Honorius merely tried to allay the rising bitterness of the

controversy by securing silence. In the next place, taking the letters as they

stand, the very most that can be clearly and incontrovertibly deduced from them

is, that Honorius was not a profound or acute theologian, and that he allowed

himself to be confused and misled by the wily Sergius as to what the issue really

was and too readily accepted the latter's misrepresentation of his opponents'

position, to the effect that the assertion of two wills in Christ meant two contrary

or discordant wills. Finally, in reference to the condemnation of Honorius as a

heretic, it is to be remembered that there is no ecumenical sentence affirming

the fact either that Honorius's letters to Sergius contain heresy, or that they were

intended to define the question with which they deal. The sentence passed by

the fathers of the council has ecumenical value only in so far as it was approved

by Leo II; but, in approving the condemnation of Honorius, his successor adds

the very important qualification that he is condemned, not for the doctrinal reason

that he taught heresy, but on the moral ground that he was wanting in the

vigilance expected from him in his Apostolic office and thereby allowed a heresy

to make headway which he should have crushed in its beginnings.

Pope Vigilius. There is still less reason for trying to found an objection to papal

infallibility on the wavering conduct of Pope Vigilius in connection with the

controversy of the Three Chapters; and it is all the more needless to delay upon

this instance as most modern opponents of the papal claims no longer appeal to

it.

Galileo. As to the Galileo affair, it is quite enough to point out the fact that the

condemnation of the heliocentric theory was the work of a fallible tribunal. The

pope cannot delegate the exercise of his infallible authority to the Roman

Congregations, and whatever issues formally in the name of any of these, even

when approved and confirmed in the ordinary official way by the pope, does not

pretend to be ex cathedra and infallible. The pope, of course, can convert

doctrinal decisions of the Holy Office, which are not in themselves infallible, into

ex cathedra papal pronouncements, but in doing so he must comply with the

conditions already explained -- which neither Paul V nor Urban VIII did in the

Galileo case.

Conclusion. The broad fact, therefore, remains certain that no ex cathedra

definition of any pope has ever been shown to be erroneous.

Mutual Relations of the Organs of Infallibility

A few brief remarks under this head will serve to make the Catholic conception of

ecclesiastical infallibility still clearer. Three organs have been mentioned:

the bishops dispersed throughout the world in union with the Holy See;

ecumenical councils under the headship of the pope; and

the pope himself separately.

Through the first of these is exercised what theologians describe as the

ordinarium magisterium, i. e. the common or everyday teaching authority of the

Church; through the second and third the magisterium solemne, or undeniably

definitive authority. Practically speaking, at the present day, and for many

centuries in the past, only the decisions of ecumenical councils and the ex

cathedra teaching of the pope have been treated as strictly definitive in the

canonical sense, and the function of the magisterium ordinarium has been

concerned with the effective promulgation and maintenance of what has been

formally defined by the magisterium solemne or may be legitimately deduced

from its definitions.

Even the ordinarium magisterium is not independent of the pope. In other words,

it is only bishops who are in corporate union with the pope, the Divinely

constituted head and centre of Christ's mystical body, the one true Church, who

have any claim to share in the charisma by which the infallibility of their morally

unanimous teaching is divinely guaranteed according to the terms of Christ's

promises. And as the pope's supremacy is also an essential factor in the

constitution of an ecumenical council -- and has in fact been the formal and

determining factor in deciding the ecumenicity of those very councils whose

authority is recognized by Eastern schismatics and Anglicans -- it naturally

occurs to enquire how conciliar infallibility is related to papal. Now this relation, in

the Catholic view, may be explained briefly as follows:

Theories of conciliar and of papal infallibility do not logically stand or fall

together, since in the Catholic view the co-operation and confirmation of

the pope in his purely primatial capacity are necessary, according to the

Divine constitution of the Church, for the ecumenicity and infallibility of a

council. This has, de facto, been the formal test of ecumenicity; and it

would be necessary even in the hypothesis that the pope himself were

fallible. An infallible organ may be constituted by the head and members

of a corporate body acting jointly although neither taken separately is

infallible. Hence the pope teaching ex cathedra and an ecumenical council

subject to the approbation of the pope as its head are distinct organs of

infallibility.

Hence, also, the Gallican contention is excluded, that an ecumenical

council is superior, either in jurisdiction or in doctrinal authority, to a

certainly legitimate pope, and that one may appeal from the latter to the

former. Nor is this conclusion contradicted by the fact that, for the

purpose of putting an end to the Great Western Schism and securing a

certainly legitimate pope, the Council of Constance deposed John XXIII,

whose election was considered doubtful, the other probably legitimate

claimant, Gregory XII, having resigned. This was what might be described

as an extra-constitutional crisis; and, as the Church has a right in such

circumstances to remove reasonable doubt and provide a pope whose

claims would be indisputable, even an acephalous council, supported by

the body of bishops throughout the world, was competent to meet this

altogether exceptional emergency without thereby setting up a precedent

that could be erected into a regular constitutional rule, as the Gallicans

wrongly imagined.

A similar exceptional situation migkt arise were a pope to become a

public heretic, i.e., were he publicly and officially to teach some doctrine

clearly opposed to what has been defined as de fide catholicâ. But in this

case many theologians hoId that no formal sentence of deposition would

be required, as, by becoming a public heretic, the pope would ipso facto

cease to be pope. This, however, is a hypothetical case which has never

actually occurred; even the case of Honorius, were it proved that he taught

the Monothelite heresy, would not be a case in point.

IV. SCOPE AND OBJECT OF INFALLIBILITY

1. In the Vatican definition infallibility (whether of fhe Church at large or of the

pope) is affirmed only in regard to doctrines of faith or morals; but within the

province of faith and morals its scope is not limited to doctrines that have been

formally revealed. This, however, is clearly understood to be what theologians call

the direct and primary object of infallible authority: it was for the maintenance and

interpretation and legitimate development of Christ's teaching that the Church

was endowed with this charisma. But if this primary function is to be adequately

and effectively discharged, it is clear that there must also be indirect and

secondary objects to which infallibility extends, namely, doctrines and facts

which, although they cannot strictly speaking be said to be revealed, are

nevertheless so intimately connected with revealed truths that, were one free to

deny the former, he would logically deny the latter and thus defeat the primary

purpose for which infallibility was promised by Christ to His Church. This principle

is expressly affrmed by the Vatican Council when it says that "the Church,

which, together with the Apostolic office of teaching received the command to

guard the deposit of faith, possesses also by Divine authority (divinitus) the right

to condemn science falsely so called, lest anyone should be cheated by

philosophy and vain conceit (cf. Colossians 2:8)" (Denz., 1798, old no. 1845).

2. Catholic theologians are agreed in recognising the general principle that has

just been stated, but it cannot be said that they are equally unanimous in regard

to the concrete applications of this principle. Yet it is generally held, and may be

said to be theologically certain, (a) that what are technically described as

"theological conclusions," i. e. inferences deduced from two premises, one of

which is revealed and the other verified by reason, fall under the scope of the

Church's infallible authority. (b) It is also generally held, and rightlv that questions

of dogmatic fact, in regard to which definite certainty is required for the safe

custody and interpretation of revealed truth, may be determined infallibly by the

Church. Such questions, for example, would be: whether a certain pope is

legitimate, or a certain council ecumenical, or whether objective heresy or error is

taught in a certain book or other published document. This last point in particular

figured prominently in the Jansenist controversy, the heretics contending that,

while the famous five propositions attributed to Jansenius were rightly

condemned, they did not truly express the doctrine contained in his book

"Augustinus". Clement XI, in condemning this subterfuge (see Denz., 1350, old

no. 1317) merely reasserted the principle which had been followed by the fathers

of Nicaea in condemning the "Thalia" of Arius, by the fathers of Ephesus in

condemning the writings of Nestorius, and by the Second Council of

Constantinople in condemning the Three Chapters. (c) It is also commonly and

rightly held that the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints, that is to

say, when canonization takes place according to the solemn process that has

been followed since the ninth century. Mere beatification, however, as

distinguished from canonization, is not held to be infallible, and in canonization

itself the only fact that is infallibly determined is that the soul of the canonized

saint departed in the state of grace and already enjoys the beatific vision. (d) As

to moral precepts or laws, as distinct from moral doctrine, infallibility goes no

farther than to protect the Church against passing universal laws which in

principle would be immoral. It would be out of place to speak of infallibility in

connection the opportuneness or the administration of necessarily changing

disciplinary laws, although, of course, Catholics believe that the Church receives

appropriate Divine guidance in this and in similar matters where practical spiritual

wisdom is required.

V. WHAT TEACHING IS INFALLIBLE?

A word or two under this head, summarizing what has been already explained in

this and in other articles will suffice.

As regards matter, only doctrines of faith and morals, and facts so intimately

connected with these as to require infallible determination, fall under tbe scope of

infallible ecclesiastical teaching. These doctrines or facts need not necessarily

be revealed; it is enough if the revealed deposit cannot be adequately and

effectively guarded and explained, unless they are infallibly determined.

As to the organ of authority by which such doctrines or facts are determined,

three possible organs exist. One of these, the magisterium ordinarium, is liable

to be somewhat indefinite in its pronouncements and, as a consequence,

practically ineffective as an organ. The other two, however, are adequately

efficient organs, and when they definitively decide any question of faith or morals

that may arise, no believer who pays due attention to Christ's promises can

consistently refuse to assent with absolute and irrevocable certainty to their

teaching.

But before being bound to give such an assent, the believer has a right to be

certain that the teaching in question is definitive (since only definitive teaching is

infallible); and the means by which the definitive intention, whether of a council or

of the pope, may be recognized have been stated above. It need only be added

here that not everything in a conciliar or papal pronouncement, in which some

doctrine is defined, is to be treated as definitive and infallible. For example, in the

lengthy Bull of Pius IX defining the Immaculate Conception the strictly definitive

and infallible portion is comprised in a sentence or two; and the same is true in

many cases in regard to conciliar decisions. The merely argumentative and

justificatory statements embodied in definitive judgments, however true and

authoritative they may be, are not covered by the guarantee of infallibility which

attaches to the strictly definitive sentences -- unless, indeed, their infallibility has

been previously or subsequently established by an independent decision.

P. J. TONER

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume VII

Nihil Obstat, June 1, 1910. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor

Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.com