The Pope

The title pope, once used with far greater latitude (see below, section V), is at

present employed solely to denote the Bishop of Rome, who, in virtue of his

position as successor of St. Peter, is the chief pastor of the whole Church, the

Vicar of Christ upon earth.

Besides the bishopric of the Roman Diocese, certain other dignities are held by

the pope as well as the supreme and universal pastorate: he is Archbishop of the

Roman Province, Primate of Italy and the adjacent islands, and sole Patriarch of

the Western Church. The Church's doctrine as to the pope was authoritatively

declared in the Vatican Council in the Constitution "Pastor Aeternus". The four

chapters of that Constitution deal respectively with the office of Supreme Head

conferred on St. Peter, the perpetuity of this office in the person of the Roman

pontiff, the pope's jurisdiction over the faithful, and his supreme authority to define

in all questions of faith and morals. This last point has been sufficiently

discussed in the article INFALLIBILITY, and will be only incidentally touched on

here.

The present article is divided as follows:

I. Institution of a Supreme Head by Christ

II. Primacy of the Roman See

III. Nature and Extent of the Papal Power

IV. Jurisdictional Rights and Prerogatives of the Pope

V. Primacy of Honour: Titles and Insignia

I. INSTITUTION OF A SUPREME HEAD BY CHRIST

The proof that Christ constituted St. Peter head of His Church is found in the two

famous Petrine texts, Matthew 16:17-19, and John 21:15-17.

In Matthew 16:17-19, the office is solemnly promised to the Apostle. In response

to his profession of faith in the Divine Nature of his Master, Christ thus addresses

him:. "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona: because flesh and blood hath not

revealed it to thee, but my Father who is in heaven. And I say to thee: That thou

art Peter; and upon this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not

prevail against it. And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And

whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth it shall be bound also in heaven: and

whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven." The

prerogatives here promised are manifestly personal to Peter. His profession of

faith was not made as has been sometimes asserted, in the name of the other

Apostles. This is evident from the words of Christ. He pronounces on the

Apostle, distinguishing him by his name Simon son of John, a peculiar and

personal blessing, declaring that his knowledge regarding the Divine Sonship

sprang from a special revelation granted to him by the Father (cf. Matthew

11:27). He further proceeds to recompense this confession of His Divinity by

bestowing upon him a reward proper to himself: "Thou art Peter [Cepha,

transliterated also Kipha] and upon this rock [Cepha] I will build my Church." The

word for Peter and for rock in the original Aramaic is one and the same; this

renders it evident that the various attempts to explain the term "rock" as having

reference not to Peter himself but to something else are misinterpretations. It is

Peter who is the rock of the Church. The term ecclesia (ekklesia) here employed

is the Greek rendering of the Hebrew qahal, the name which denoted the Hebrew

nation viewed as God's Church (see CHURCH, THE, I).

Here then Christ teaches plainly that in the future the Church will be the society

of those who acknowledge Him, and that this Church will be built on Peter. The

expression presents no difficulty. In both the Old and New Testaments the

Church is often spoken of under the metaphor of God's house (Numbers 12:7;

Jeremiah 12:7; Osee 8:1; 9:15; 1 Cor. 3:9-17, Eph. 2:20-2; 1 Tim. 3:5; Hebrews

3:5; I Peter 2:5). Peter is to be to the Church what the foundation is in regard to a

house. He is to be the principle of unity, of stability, and of increase. He is the

principle of unity, since what is not joined to that foundation is no part of the

Church; of stability, since it is the firmness of this foundation in virtue of which

the Church remains unshaken by the storms which buffet her; of increase, since,

if she grows, it is because new stones are laid on this foundation. It is through

her union with Peter, Christ continues, that the Church will prove the victor in her

long contest with the Evil One: "The gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

There can be but one explanation of this striking metaphor. The only manner in

which a man can stand in such a relation to any corporate body is by

possessing authority over it. The supreme head of a body, in dependence on

whom all subordinate authorities hold their power, and he alone, can be said to

be the principle of stability, unity, and increase. The promise acquires additional

solemnity when we remember that both Old Testament prophecy (Isiah 28:16)

and Christ's own words (Matthew 7:24) had attributed this office of foundation of

the Church to Himself. He is therefore assigning to Peter, of course in a

secondary degree, a prerogative which is His own, and thereby associating the

Apostle with Himself in an altogether singular manner.

In the following verse (Matthew 16:19) He promises to bestow on Peter the keys

of the kingdom of heaven. The words refer evidently to Isaiah 22:22, where God

declares that Eliacim, the son of Helcias, shall be invested with office in place of

the worthless Sobna: "And I will lay the key of the house of David upon his

shoulder: and he shall open, and none shall shut: and he shall shut and none

shall open." In all countries the key is the symbol of authority. Thus, Christ's

words are a promise that He will confer on Peter supreme power to govern the

Church. Peter is to be His vicegerent, to rule in His place. Further the character

and extent of the power thus bestowed are indicated. It is a power to "bind" and

to "loose" -- words which, as is shown below, denote the grant of legislative and

judicial authority. And this power is granted in its fullest measure. Whatever

Peter binds or looses on earth, his act will receive the Divine ratification. The

meaning of this passage does not seem to have been challenged by any writer

until the rise of the sixteenth-century heresies. Since then a great variety of

interpretations have been put forward by Protestant controversialists. These

agree in little save in the rejection of the plain sense of Christ's words. Some

Anglican controversy tends to the view that the reward promised to St. Peter

consisted in the prominent part taken by him in the initial activities of the Church,

but that he was never more than primus inter pares among the Apostles. It is

manifest that this is quite insufficient as an explanation of the terms of Christ's

promise.

The promise made by Christ in Matthew 16:16-19, received its fulfilment after the

Resurrection in the scene described in John 21. Here the Lord, when about to

leave the earth, places the whole flock -- the sheep and the lambs alike -- in the

charge of the Apostle. The term employed in 21:16, "Be the shepherd [poimaine]

of my sheep" indicates that his task is not merely to feed but to rule. It is the

same word as is used in Psalm 2:9 (Sept.): "Thou shalt rule [poimaneis] them

with a rod of iron". The scene stands in striking parallelism with that of Matthew

16. As there the reward was given to Peter after a profession of faith which

singled him out from the other eleven, so here Christ demands a similar

protestation, but this time of a yet higher virtue: "Simon, son of John, lovest thou

Me more than these"? Here, too, as there, He bestows on the Apostle an office

which in its highest sense is proper to Himself alone. There Christ had promised

to make Peter the foundation-stone of the house of God: here He makes him the

shepherd of God's flock to take the place of Himself, the Good Shepherd. The

passage receives an admirable comment from St. Chrysostom: "He saith to him,

'Feed my sheep'. Why does He pass over the others and speak of the sheep to

Peter? He was the chosen one of the Apostles, the mouth of the disciples, the

head of the choir. For this reason Paul went up to see him rather than the others.

And also to show him that he must have confidence now that his denial had been

purged away. He entrusts him with the rule [prostasia] over the brethren. . . . If

anyone should say 'Why then was it James who received the See of Jerusalem?',

I should reply that He made Peter the teacher not of that see but of the whole

world" ["Hom. 88 (87) in Joan.", 1. Cf. Origen, "In Ep. ad Rom.", 5:10; Ephraem

Syrus "Hymn. in B. Petr." in "Bibl. Orient. Assemani", 1:95; Leo I, "Serm. iv de

natal.", 2]. Even certain Protestant commentators frankly own that Christ

undoubtedly intended here to confer the supreme pastorate on Peter. But other

scholars, relying on a passage of St. Cyril of Alexandria ("In Joan." 12:1),

maintain that the purpose of the threefold charge was simply to reinstate St.

Peter in the Apostolic commission which his threefold denial might be supposed

to have lost to him. This interpretation is devoid of all probability. There is not a

word in Scripture or in patristic tradition to suggest that St. Peter had forfeited his

Apostolic commission; and the supposition is absolutely excluded by the fact

that on the evening of the Resurrection he received the same Apostolic powers

as the others of the eleven. The solitary phrase of St. Cyril is of no weight against

the overwhelming patristic authority for the other view. That such an interpretation

should be seriously advocated proves how great is the difficulty experienced by

Protestants regarding this text.

The position of St. Peter after the Ascension, as shown in the Acts of the

Apostles, realizes to the full the great commission bestowed upon him. He is

from the first the chief of the Apostolic band -- not primus inter pares, but the

undisputed head of the Church (see CHURCH, THE, III). If then Christ, as we

have seen, established His Church as a society subordinated to a single

supreme head, it follows from the very nature of the case that this office is

perpetual, and cannot have been a mere transitory feature of ecclesiastical life.

For the Church must endure to the end the very same organization which Christ

established. But in an organized society it is precisely the constitution which is

the essential feature. A change in constitution transforms it into a society of a

different kind. If then the Church should adopt a constitution other than Christ

gave it, it would no longer be His handiwork. It would no longer be the Divine

kingdom established by Him. As a society it would have passed through

essential modifications, and thereby would have become a human, not a Divine

institution. None who believe that Christ came on earth to found a Church, an

organized society destined to endure for ever, can admit the possibility of a

change in the organization given to it by its Founder. The same conclusion also

follows from a consideration of the end which, by Christ's declaration, the

supremacy of Peter was intended to effect. He was to give the Church strength to

resist her foes, so that the gates of hell should not prevail against her. The

contest with the powers of evil does not belong to the Apostolic age alone. It is a

permanent feature of the Church's life. Hence, throughout the centuries the office

of Peter must be realized in the Church, in order that she may prevail in her

age-long struggle. Thus an analysis of Christ's words shows us that the

perpetuity of the office of supreme head is to be reckoned among the truths

revealed in Scripture. His promise to Peter conveyed not merely a personal

prerogative, but established a permanent office in the Church. And in this sense,

as will appear in the next section, His words were understood by Latin and Greek

Fathers alike.

II. PRIMACY OF THE ROMAN SEE

We have shown in the last section that Christ conferred upon St. Peter the office

of chief pastor, and that the permanence of that office is essential to the very

being of the Church. It must now be established that it belongs of right to the

Roman See. The proof will fall into two parts:

(a) that St. Peter was Bishop of Rome, and

(b) that those who succeed him in that see succeed him also in the

supreme headship.

(a) that St. Peter was Bishop of Rome

It is no longer denied by any writer of weight that St. Peter visited Rome and

suffered martyrdom there (Harnack, "Chronol.", I, 244, n. 2). Some, however, of

those who admit that he taught and suffered in Rome, deny that he was ever

bishop of the city e.g. Lightfoot, "Clement of Rome", II, 501; Harnack, op. cit., I,

703. It is not, however, difficult to show that the fact of his bishopric is so well

attested as to be historically certain. In considering this point, it will be well to

begin with the third century, when references to it become frequent, and work

backwards from this point. In the middle of the third century St. Cyprian

expressly terms the Roman See the Chair of St. Peter, saying that Cornelius has

succeeded to "the place of Fabian which is the place of Peter" (Ep 55:8; cf.

59:14). Firmilian of Caesarea notices that Stephen claimed to decide the

controversy regarding rebaptism on the ground that he held the succession from

Peter (Cyprian, Ep. 75:17). He does not deny the claim: yet certainly, had he

been able, he would have done so. Thus in 250 the Roman episcopate of Peter

was admitted by those best able to know the truth, not merely at Rome but in

the churches of Africa and of Asia Minor. In the first quarter of the century (about

220) Tertullian (De Pud. 21) mentions Callistus's claim that Peter's power to

forgive sins had descended in a special manner to him. Had the Roman Church

been merely founded by Peter and not reckoned him as its first bishop, there

could have been no ground for such a contention. Tertullian, like Firmilian, had

every motive to deny the claim. Moreover, he had himself resided at Rome, and

would have been well aware if the idea of a Roman episcopate of Peter had been,

as is contended by its opponents, a novelty dating from the first years of the third

century, supplanting the older tradition according to which Peter and Paul were

co-founders, and Linus first bishop. About the same period, Hippolytus (for

Lightfoot is surely right in holding him to be the author of the first part of the

"Liberian Catalogue" -- "Clement of Rome", 1:259) reckons Peter in the list of

Roman bishops.

We have moreover a poem, "Adversus Marcionem", written apparently at the

same period, in which Peter is said to have passed on to Linus "the chair on

which he himself had sat" (P.L., II 1077). These witnesses bring us to the

beginning of the third century. In the second century we cannot look for much

evidence. With the exception of Ignatius, Polycarp, and Clement of Alexandria,

all the writers whose works we possess are apologists against either Jews or

pagans. In works of such a character there was no reason to refer to such a

matter as Peter's Roman episcopate. Irenaeus, however, supplies us with a

cogent argument. In two passages (Adv. haer. 1:27:1, and 3:4:3) he speaks of

Hyginus as ninth Bishop of Rome, thus employing an enumeration which involves

the inclusion of Peter as first bishop (Lightfoot was undoubtedly wrong in

supposing that there was any doubt as to the correctness of the reading in the

first of these passages. In 3:4:3, the Latin version, it is true, gives "octavus"; but

the Greek text as cited by Eusebius reads enatos. Irenaeus we know visited

Rome in 177. At this date, scarcely more than a century after the death of St.

Peter, he may well have come in contact with men whose fathers had

themselves spoken to the Apostle. The tradition thus supported must be

regarded as beyond all legitimate doubt. Lightfoot's suggestion (Clement 1:64),

that it had its origin in the Clementine romance, has proved singularly

unfortunate. For it is now recognized that this work belongs not to the second,

but to the fourth century. Nor is there the slightest ground for the assertion that

the language of Irenaeus, 3:3:3, implies that Peter and Paul enjoyed a divided

episcopate at Rome -- an arrangement utterly unknown to the Church at any

period. He does, it is true, speak of the two Apostles as together handing on the

episcopate to Linus. But this expression is explained by the purpose of his

argument, which is to vindicate against the Gnostics the validity of the doctrine

taught in the Roman Church. Hence he is naturally led to lay stress on the fact

that that Church inherited the teaching of both the great Apostles. Epiphanius

("Haer." 27:6) would indeed seem to suggest the divided episcopate; but he has

apparently merely misunderstood the words of Irenaeus.

(b) that those who succeed him in that see succeed him also in the

supreme headship

History bears complete testimony that from the very earliest times the Roman

See has ever claimed the supreme headship, and that that headship has been

freely acknowledged by the universal Church. We shall here confine ourselves to

the consideration of the evidence afforded by the first three centuries. The first

witness is St. Clement, a disciple of the Apostles, who, after Linus and

Anacletus, succeeded St. Peter as the fourth in the list of popes. In his "Epistle

to the Corinthians", written in 95 or 96, he bids them receive back the bishops

whom a turbulent faction among them had expelled. "If any man", he says,

"should be disobedient unto the words spoken by God through us, let them

understand that they will entangle themselves in no slight transgression and

danger" (Ep. 59). Moreover, he bids them "render obedience unto the things

written by us through the Holy Spirit". The tone of authority which inspires the

latter appears so clearly that Lightfoot did not hesitate to speak of it as" the first

step towards papal domination (Clement 1:70). Thus, at the very commencement

of church history, before the last survivor of the Apostles had passed away, we

find a Bishop of Rome, himself a disciple of St. Peter, intervening in the affairs of

another Church and claiming to settle the matter by a decision spoken under the

influence of the Holy Spirit. Such a fact admits of one explanation alone. It is that

in the days when the Apostolic teaching was yet fresh in men's minds the

universal Church recognized in the Bishop of Rome the office of supreme head.

A few years later (about 107) St. Ignatius of Antioch, in the opening of his letter

to the Roman Church, refers to its presiding over all other Churches. He

addresses it as "presiding over the brotherhood of love [prokathemene tes

agapes] The expression, as Funk rightly notes, is grammatically incompatible

with the translation advocated by some non-Catholic writers, "pre-eminent in

works of love". The same century gives us the witness of St. Irenaeus -- a man

who stands in the closest connexion with the age of the Apostles, since he was

a disciple of St. Polycarp, who had been appointed. Bishop of Smyrna by St.

John. In his work "Adversus Haereses" (3:3:2) he brings against the Gnostic

sects of his day the argument that their doctrines have no support in the

Apostolic tradition faithfully preserved by the Churches, which could trace the

succession of their bishops back to the Twelve. He writes: " Because it would be

too long in such a volume as this to enumerate the successions of all the

churches, we point to the tradition of that very great and very ancient and

universally known Church, which was founded and established at Rome, by the

two most glorious Apostles, Peter and Paul: we point I say, to the tradition which

this Church has from the Apostles, and to her faith proclaimed to men which

comes down to our time through the succession of her bishops, and so we put to

shame . . . all who assemble in unauthorized meetings. For with this Church,

because of its superior authority, every Church must agree -- that is the faithful

everywhere -- in communion with which Church the tradition of the Apostles has

been always preserved by those who are everywhere [Ad hanc enim eoclesiam

propter potentiorem principalitatem necesse est omnem convenire ecclesiam,

hoc est eos qui sunt undique fideles, in qua semper ab his qui sunt undique,

conservata est ea quâ est ab apostolis traditio]". He then proceeds to enumerate

the Roman succession from Linus to Eleutherius, the twelfth after the Apostles,

who then occupied the see. Non-Catholic writers have sought to rob the passage

of its importance by translating the word convenire "to resort to", and thus

understanding it to mean no more than that the faithful from every side (undique)

resorted to Rome, so that thus the stream of doctrine in that Church was kept

immune from error. Such a rendering, however, is excluded by the construction of

the argument, which is based entirely on the contention that the Roman doctrine

is pure by reason of its derivation from the two great Apostolic founders of the

Church, Sts. Peter and Paul. The frequent visits made to Rome by members of

other Christian Churches could contribute nothing to this. On the other hand the

traditional rendering is postulated by the context, and, though the object of

innumerable attacks, none other possessing any real degree of probability has

been suggested in its place (see Dom. J. Chapman in "Revue Benedictine",

1895, p. 48).

During the pontificate of St. Victor (189-98) we have the most explicit assertion of

the supremacy of the Roman See in regard to other Churches. A difference of

practice between the Churches of Asia Minor and the rest of the Christian world

in regard to the day of the Paschal festival led the pope to take action. There is

some ground for supposing that the Montanist heretics maintained the Asiatic (or

Quartodeciman) practice to be the true one: in this case it would be undesirable

that any body of Catholic Christians should appear to support them. But, under

any circumstances, such a diversity in the ecclesiastical life of different countries

may well have constituted a regrettable feature in the Church, whose very

purpose it was to bear witness by her unity to the oneness of God (John 17:21).

Victor bade the Asiatic Churches conform to the custom of the remainder of the

Church, but was met with determined resistance by Polycrates of Ephesus, who

claimed that their custom derived from St. John himself. Victor replied by an

excommunication. St. Irenaeus, however, intervened, exhorting Victor not to cut

off whole Churches on account of a point which was not a matter of faith. He

assumes that the nope can exercise the power, but urges him not to do so.

Similarly the resistance of the Asiatic bishops involved no denial of the

supremacy of Rome. It indicates solely that the bishops believed St. Victor to be

abusing his power in bidding them renounce a custom for which they had

Apostolic authority. It was indeed inevitable that, as the Church spread and

developed, new problems should present themselves, and that questions should

arise as to whether the supreme authority could be legitimately exercised in this

or that case. St. Victor, seeing that more harm than good would come from

insistence, withdrew the imposed penalty.

Not many years since a new and important piece of evidence was brought to light

in Asia Minor dating from this period. The sepulchral inscription of Abercius,

Bishop of Hieropolis (d. about 200), contains an account of his travels couched in

allegorical language. He speaks thus of the Roman Church: "To Rome He

[Christ] sent me to contemplate majesty: and to see a queen golden-robed and

golden-sandalled." It is difficult not to recognize in this description a testimony to

the supreme position of the Roman See. Tertullian's bitter polemic, "De Pudicitia"

(about 220), was called forth by an exercise of papal prerogative. Pope Callistus

had decided that the rigid discipline which had hitherto prevailed in many

Churches must be in large measure relaxed. Tertullian, now lapsed into heresy,

fiercely attacks "the peremptory edict", which "the supreme pontiff, the bishop of

bishops", has sent forth. The words are intended as sarcasm: but none the less

they indicate clearly the position of authority claimed by Rome. And the

opposition comes, not from a Catholic bishop, but from a Montanist heretic.

The views of St. Cyprian (d. 258) in regard to papal authority have given rise to

much discussion. He undoubtedly entertained exaggerated views as to the

independence of individual bishops, which eventually led him into serious conflict

with Rome. Yet on the fundamental principle his position is clear. He attributed

an effective primacy to the pope as the successor of Peter. He makes

communion with the See of Rome essential to Catholic communion, speaking of

it as "the principal Church whence episcopal unity had its rise" (ad Petri

cathedram et ad ecclesiam principalem unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est). The

force of this expression becomes clear when viewed in the light of his doctrine as

to the unity of the Church. This was he teaches, established by Christ when He

founded His Church upon Peter. By this act the unity of the Apostolic college

was ensured through the unity of the foundation. The bishops through all time

form a similar college, and are bound in a like indivisible unity. Of this unity the

Chair of Peter is the source. It fulfils the very office as principle of union which

Peter fulfilled in his lifetime. Hence to communicate with an antipope such as

Novatian would be schism (Ep. 68:1). He holds, also, that the pope has authority

to depose an heretical bishop. When Marcian of Arles fell into heresy, Cyprian,

at the request of the bishops of the province, wrote to urge Pope Stephen "to

send letters by which, Marcian having been excommunicated, another may be

substituted in his place" (Ep. 68:3). It is manifest that one who regarded the

Roman See in this light believed that the pope possessed a real and effective

Primacy. At the same time it is not to be denied that his views as to the right of

the pope to interfere in the government of a diocese already subject to a

legitimate and orthodox bishop were inadequate. In the rebaptism controversy his

language in regard to St. Stephen was bitter and intemperate. His error on this

point does not, however, detract from the fact that he admitted a primacy, not

merely of honour but of jurisdiction. Nor should his mistake occasion too much

surprise. It is as true in the Church as in merely human institutions that the full

implications of a general principle are only realized gradually. The claim to apply

it in a particular case is often contested at first, though later ages may wonder

that such opposition was possible.

Contemporary with St. Cyprian was St. Dionysius of Alexandria. Two incidents

bearing on the present question are related of him. Eusebius (Hist. eccl. 7:9)

gives us a letter addressed by him to St. Xystus II regarding the case of a man

who, as it appeared, had been invalidly baptized by heretics, but who for many

years had been frequenting the sacraments of the Church. In it he says that he

needs St. Xystus's advice and begs for his decision (gnomen), that he may not

fall into error (dedios me hara sphallomai). Again, some years later, the same

patriarch occasioned anxiety to some of the brethren by making use of some

expressions which appeared hardly compatible with a full belief in the Divinity of

Christ. They promptly had recourse to the Holy See and accused him to his

namesake, St. Dionysius of Rome, of heretical leanings. The pope replied by

laying down authoritatively the true doctrine on the subject. Both events are

instructive as showing us how Rome was recognized by the second see in

Christendom as empowered to speak with authority on matters of doctrine. (St.

Athanasius, "De sententia Dionysii" in P. G., XXV, 500). Equally noteworthy is

the action of Emperor Aurelian in 270. A synod of bishops had condemned Paul

of Samosata, Patriarch of Alexandria, on a charge of heresy, and had elected

Domnus bishop in his place. Paul refused to withdraw, and appeal was made to

the civil power. The emperor decreed that he who was acknowledged by the

bishops of Italy and the Bishop of Rome, must be recognized as rightful

occupant of the see. The incident proves that even the pagans themselves knew

well that communion with the Roman See was the essential mark of all Christian

Churches. That the imperial Government was well aware of the position of the

pope among Christians derives additional confirmation from the saying of St.

Cyprian that Decius would have sooner heard of the proclamation of a rival

emperor than of the election of a new pope to fill the place of the martyred Fabian

(Ep. 55:9).

The limits of the present article prevent us from carrying the historical argument

further than the year 300. Nor is it in fact necessary to do so. From the beginning

of the fourth century the supremacy of Rome is writ large upon the page of

history. It is only in regard to the first age of the Church that any question can

arise. But the facts we have recounted are entirely sufficient to prove to any

unprejudiced mind that the supremacy was exercised and acknowledged from

the days of the Apostles. It was not of course exercised in the same way as in

later times. The Church was as yet in her infancy: and it would be irrational to

look for a fully developed procedure governing the relations of the supreme pontiff

to the bishops of other sees. To establish such a system was the work of time,

and it was only gradually embodied in the canons. There would, moreover, be

little call for frequent intervention when the Apostolic tradition was still fresh and

vigorous in every part of Christendom. Hence the papal prerogatives came into

play but rarely. But when the Faith was threatened, or the vital welfare of souls

demanded action, then Rome intervened. Such were the causes which led to the

intervention of St. Dionysius, St. Stephen, St. Callistus, St. Victor, and St.

Clement, and their claim to supremacy as the occupants of the Chair of Peter

was not disputed. In view of the purposes with which, and with which alone,

these early popes employed their supreme power, the contention, so stoutly

maintained by Protestant controversialists, that the Roman primacy had its origin

in papal ambition, disappears. The motive which inspired these men was not

earthly ambition, but zeal for the Faith and the consciousness that to them had

been committed the responsibility of its guardianship. The controversialists in

question even claim that they are justified in refusing to admit as evidence for the

papal primacy any pronouncement emanating from a Roman source, on the

ground that, where the personal interests of anyone are concerned, his

statements should not be admitted as evidence. Such an objection is utterly

fallacious. We are dealing here, not with the statements of an individual, but with

the tradition of a Church -- of that Church which, even from the earliest times,

was known for the purity of its doctrine, and which had had for its founders and

instructors the two chief Apostles, St. Peter and St. Paul. That tradition,

moreover, is absolutely unbroken, as the pronouncements of the long series of

popes bear witness. Nor does it stand alone. The utterances, in which the popes

assert their claims to the obedience of all Christian Churches, form part and

parcel of a great body of testimony to the Petrine privileges, issuing not merely

from the Western Fathers but from those of Greece, Syria, and Egypt. The claim

to reject the evidence which comes to us from Rome may be skilful as a piece of

special pleading, but it can claim no other value. The first to employ this

argument were some of the Gallicans. But it is deservedly repudiated as

fallacious and unworthy by Bossuet in his "Defensio cleri gallicani" (II, 1. XI, c.

vi).

The primacy of St. Peter and the perpetuity of that primacy in the Roman See

are dogmatically defined in the canons attached to the first two chapters of the

Constitution "Pastor Aeternus":

"If anyone shall say that Blessed Peter the Apostle was not constituted

by Christ our Lord as chief of all the Apostles and the visible head of the

whole Church militant: or that he did not receive directly and immediately

from the same Lord Jesus Christ a primacy of true and proper jurisdiction,

but one of honour only: let him be anathema."

"If any one shall say that it is not by the institution of Christ our Lord

Himself or by divinely established right that Blessed Peter has perpetual

successors in his primacy over the universal Church: OF that the Roman

Pontiff is not the successor of Blessed Peter in this same primacy. -- let

him be anathema" (Denzinger-Bannwart, "Enchiridion", nn. 1823, 1825).

A question may be raised as to the precise dogmatic value of the clause of the

second canon in which it is asserted that the Roman pontiff is Peter's successor.

The truth is infallibly defined. But the Church has authority to define not merely

those truths which form part of the original deposit of revelation, but also such as

are necessarily connected with this deposit. The former are held fide divina, the

latter fide infallibili. Although Christ established the perpetual office of supreme

head, Scripture does not tell us that He fixed the law according to which the

headship should descend. Granting that He left this to Peter to determine, it is

plain that the Apostle need not have attached the primacy to his own see: he

might have attached it to another. Some have thought that the law establishing

the succession in the Roman episcopate became known to the Apostolic Church

as an historic fact. In this case the dogma that the Roman pontiff is at all times

the Church's chief pastor would be the conclusion from two premises -- the

revealed truth that the Church must ever have a supreme head, and the historic

fact that St. Peter attached that office to the Roman See. This conclusion, while

necessarily connected with revelation, is not part of revelation, and is accepted

fide infallibili. According to other theologians the proposition in question is part of

the deposit of faith itself. In this case the Apostles must have known the law

determining the succession to the Bishop of Rome, not merely on human

testimony, but also by Divine revelation, and they must have taught it as a

revealed truth to their disciples. It is this view which is commonly adopted. The

definition of the Vatican to the effect that the successor of St. Peter is ever to be

found in the Roman pontiff is almost universally held to be a truth revealed by the

Holy Spirit to the Apostles, and by them transmitted to the Church.

III. NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PAPAL POWER

This section is divided as follows :

1.the pope's universal coercive jurisdiction

2.the pope's immediate and ordinary jurisdiction in regard of all the faithful,

whether singly or collectively

3.the right of entertaining appeals in all ecclesiastical causes.

The relation of the pope's authority to that of ecumenical councils, and to the civil

power, are discussed in separate articles (see GENERAL COUNCILS; CIVIL

ALLEGIANCE).

(1) The Pope's Universal Coercive Jurisdiction

Not only did Christ constitute St. Peter head of the Church, but in the words,

"Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and

whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed in heaven," He indicated

the scope of this headship. The expressions binding and loosing here employed

are derived from the current terminology of the Rabbinic schools. A doctor who

declared a thing to be prohibited by the law was said to bind, for thereby he

imposed an obligation on the conscience. He who declared it to be lawful was

said to loose). In this way the terms had come respectively to signify official

commands and permissions in general. The words of Christ, therefore, as

understood by His hearers, conveyed the promise to St. Peter of legislative

authority within the kingdom over which He had just set him, and legislative

authority carries with it as its necessary accompaniment judicial authority.

Moreover, the powers conferred in these regards are plenary. This is plainly

indicated by the generality of the terms employed: "Whatsoever thou shalt bind .

. . Whatsoever thou shalt loose"; nothing is withheld. Further, Peter's authority is

subordinated to no earthly superior. The sentences which he gives are to be

forthwith ratified in heaven. They do not need the antecedent approval of any

other tribunal. He is independent of all save the Master who appointed him. The

words as to the power of binding and loosing are, therefore, elucidatory of the

promise of the keys which immediately precedes. They explain in what sense

Peter is governor and head of Christ's kingdom, the Church, by promising him

legislative and judicial authority in the fullest sense. In other words, Peter and his

successors have power to impose laws both preceptive and prohibitive, power

likewise to grant dispensation from these laws, and, when needful, to annul

them. It is theirs to judge offences against the laws, to impose and to remit

penalties. This judicial authority will even include the power to pardon sin. For sin

is a breach of the laws of the supernatural kingdom, and falls under the

cognizance of its constituted judges. The gift of this particular power, however, is

not expressed with full clearness in this passage. It needed Christ's words (John

20:23) to remove all ambiguity. Further, since the Church is the kingdom of the

truth, so that an essential note in all her members is the act of submission by

which they accept the doctrine of Christ in its entirety, supreme power in this

kingdom carries with it a supreme magisterium -- authority to declare that

doctrine and to prescribe a rule of faith obligatory on all. Here, too, Peter is

subordinated to none save his Master alone; he is the supreme teacher as he is

the supreme ruler. However, the tremendous powers thus conferred are limited in

their scope by their reference to the ends of the kingdom and to them only. The

authority of Peter and his successors does not extend beyond this sphere. With

matters that are altogether extrinsic to the Church they are not concerned.

Protestant controversialists contend strenuously that the words, "Whatsoever

thou shalt bind etc.", confer no special prerogative on Peter, since precisely the

same gift, they allege, is conferred on all the Apostles (Matthew 18:18). It is, of

course, the case that in that passage the same words are used in regard of all

the Twelve. Yet there is a manifest difference between the gift to Peter and that

bestowed on the others. In his case the gift is connected with the power of the

keys, and this power, as we have seen, signified the supreme authority over the

whole kingdom. That gift was not bestowed on the other eleven: and the gift

Christ bestowed on them in Matthew 18:18, was received by them as members

of the kingdom, and as subject to the authority of him who should be Christ's

vicegerent on earth. There is in fact a striking parallelism between Matthew

16:19, and the words employed in reference to Christ Himself in Apocalypse 3:7:

"He that hath the key of David; he that openeth, and no man shutteth; shutteth,

and no man openeth." In both cases the second clause declares the meaning of

the first, and the power signified in the first clause by the metaphor of the keys is

supreme. It is worthy of note that to no one else save to Christ and His chosen

vicegerent does Holy Scripture attribute the power of the keys.

Certain patristic passages are further adduced by non-Catholics as adverse to

the meaning given by the Church to Matthew 16:19. St. Augustine in several

places tells us that Peter received the keys as representing the Church -- e.g. "In

Joan.", tr. 1:12: "Si hoc Petro tantum dictum est, non facit hoc Ecclesia . . .; si

hoc ergo in Ecclesia fit, Petrus quando claves accepit, Ecclesiam sanctam

significavit' (If this was said to Peter alone, the Church cannot exercise this

power . . .; if this power is exercised in the Church, then when Peter received the

keys, he signified the Holy Church); cf. tr. 124:5; Serm. 295. It is argued that,

according to Augustine, the power denoted by the keys resides primarily not in

Peter, but in the whole Church. Christ's gift to His people was merely bestowed

on Peter as representing the whole body of the faithful. The right to forgive sins,

to exclude from communion, to exercise any other acts of authority, is really the

prerogative of the whole Christian congregation. If the minister performs these

acts he does so as delegate of the people. The argument, which was formerly

employed by Gallican controversialists (cf. Febronius, "De statu eccl.", 1:76),

however, rests on a misunderstanding of the passages. Augustine is

controverting the Novatian heretics, who affirmed that the power to remit sins was

a purely Personal gift to Peter alone, and had disappeared with him. He therefore

asserts that Peter received it that it might remain for ever in the Church and be

used for its benefit. It is in that sense alone that he says that Peter represented

the Church. There is no foundation whatever for saying that he desired to affirm

that the Church was the true recipient of the power conferred. Such a view would

be contrary to the whole patristic tradition, and is expressly reprobated in the

Vatican Decree, cap. 1.

It appears from what has been said that, when the popes legislate for the faithful,

when they try offenders by juridical process, and enforce their sentences by

censures and excommunications, they are employing powers conceded to them

by Christ. Their authority to exercise jurisdiction in this way is not founded on the

grant of any civil ruler. Indeed the Church has claimed and exercised these

powers from the very first. When the Apostles, after the Council of Jerusalem,

sent out their decree as vested with Divine authority (Acts 15:28), they were

imposing a law on the faithful. When St. Paul bids Timothy not receive an

accusation against a presbyter unless it be supported by two or three witnesses,

he clearly supposes him to be empowered to judge him in foro externo. This

claim to exercise coercive jurisdiction has, as might be expected been denied by

various heterodox writers. Thus Marsilius Patavinus (Defensor Pacis 2:4),

Antonius de Dominis (De rep. eccl. 4:6-7, 9), Richer (De eccl. et pol. potestate,

11-12), and later the Synod of Pistoia, all alike maintained that coercive

jurisdiction of every kind belongs to the civil power alone, and sought to restrict

the Church to the use of moral means. This error has always been condemned

by the Holy See. Thus, in the Bull "Auctorem Fidei", Pius VI makes the following

pronouncement regarding one of the Pistoian propositions: "[The aforesaid

proposition] in respect of its insinuation that the Church does not possess

authority to exact subjection to her decrees otherwise than by means dependent

on persuasion: so far as this signifies that the Church 'has not received from God

power, not merely to direct by counsel and persuasion but further to command

by laws, and to coerce and compel the delinquent and contumacious by external

and salutary penalties' [from the brief 'Ad assiduas' (1755) of Benedict XIV], leads

to a system already condemned as heretical. " Nor may it be held that the

pope's laws must exclusively concern spiritual objects, and their penalties be

exclusively of a spiritual character. The Church is a perfect society (see

CHURCH XIII). She is not dependent on the permission of the State for her

existence, but holds her charter from God. As a perfect society she has a right

to all those means which are necessary for the attaining of her end. These,

however, will include far more than spiritual objects and spiritual penalties alone:

for the Church requires certain material possessions, such, for example, as

churches, schools, seminaries, together with the endowments necessary for

their sustentation. The administration and the due protection of these goods will

require legislation other than what is limited to the spiritual sphere. A large body

of canon law must inevitably be formed to determine the conditions of their

management. Indeed, there is a fallacy in the assertion that the Church is a

spiritual society; it is spiritual as regards the ultimate end to which all its

activities are directed, but not as regards its present constitution nor as regards

the means at its disposal. The question has been raised whether it be lawful for

the Church, not merely to sentence a delinquent to physical penalties, but itself

to inflict these penalties. As to this, it is sufficient to note that the right of the

Church to invoke the aid of the civil power to execute her sentences is expressly

asserted by Boniface VIII in the Bull "Unam Sanctam" This declaration, even if it

be not one of those portions of the Bull in which the pope is defining a point of

faith, is so clearly connected with the parts expressly stated to possess such

character that it is held by theologians to be theologically certain (Palmieri, "De

Romano Pontifice", thes. 21). The question is of theoretical, rather than of

practical importance, since civil Governments have long ceased to own the

obligation of enforcing the decisions of any ecclesiastical authority. This indeed

became inevitable when large sections of the population ceased to be Catholic.

The state of things supposed could only exist when a whole nation was

thoroughly Catholic in spirit, and the force of papal decisions was recognized by

all as binding in conscience.

(2) The Pope's Immediate and Ordinary Jurisdiction

In the Constitution "Pastor Aeternus", cap. 3, the pope is declared to possess

ordinary, immediate, and episcopal jurisdiction over all the faithful: "We teach,

moreover, and declare that, by the disposition of God, the Roman Church

possesses supreme ordinary authority over all Churches, and that the jurisdiction

of the Roman Pontiff, which is true episcopal jurisdiction is immediate in its

character" (Enchir., n. 1827). It is further added that this authority extends to all

alike, both pastors and faithful, whether singly or collectively. An ordinary

jurisdiction is one which is exercised by the holder, not by reason of any

delegation, but in virtue of the office which he himself holds. All who acknowledge

in the pope any primacy of jurisdiction acknowledge that jurisdiction to be

ordinary. This point, therefore, does not call for discussion. That the papal

authority is likewise immediate has, however, been called in question.

Jurisdiction is immediate when its possessor stands in direct relation to those

with whose oversight he is charged. If, on the other hand, the supreme authority

can only deal directly with the proximate superiors, and not with the subjects

save through their intervention, his power is not Immediate but mediate. That the

pope's jurisdiction is not thus restricted appears from the analysis already given

of Christ's words to St. Peter. It has been shown that He conferred on him a

primacy over the Church, which is universal in its scope, extending to all the

Church's members, and which needs the support of no other power. A primacy

such as this manifestly gives to him and to his successors a direct authority over

all the faithful. This is also implied in the words of the pastoral commission, "

Feed my sheep ". The shepherd exercises immediate authority over all the sheep

of his flock. Every member of the Church has been thus committed to Peter and

those who follow him. This immediate authority has been always claimed by the

Holy See. It was, however, denied by Febronius (op. cit., 7:7). That writer

contended that the duty of the pope was to exercise a general oversight over the

Church and to direct the bishops by his counsel; in case of necessity, where the

legitimate pastor was guilty of grave wrong, he could pronounce sentence of

excommunication against him and proceed against him according to the canons,

but he could not on his own authority depose him (op. cit., 2:4:9). The Febronian

doctrines, though devoid of any historical foundation, yet, through their appeal to

the spirit of nationalism, exerted a powerful influence for harm on Catholic life in

Germany during the eighteenth and part of the nineteenth century. Thus it was

imperative that the error should be definitively condemned. That the pope's power

is truly episcopal needs no proof. It follows from the fact that he enjoys an

ordinary pastoral authority, both legislative and judicial, and immediate in relation

to its subjects. Moreover, since this power regards the pastors as well as the

faithful, the pope is rightly termed Pastor pastorum, and Episcopus episcoporum.

It is frequently objected by writers of the Anglican school that, by declaring the

pope to possess an immediate episcopal jurisdiction over all the faithful, the

Vatican Council destroyed the authority of the diocesan episcopate. It is further

pointed out that St. Gregory the Great expressly repudiated this title (Ep. 7:27;

8:30). To this it is replied that no difficulty is involved in the exercise of immediate

jurisdiction over the same subjects by two rulers, provided only that these rulers

stand in subordination, the one to the other. We constantly see the system at

work. In an army the regimental officer and the general both possess immediate

authority over the soldiers; yet no one maintains that the inferior authority is

thereby annulled. The objection lacks all weight. The Vatican Council says most

justly (cap. iii): "This power of the supreme pontiff in no way derogates from the

ordinary immediate power of episcopal jurisdiction, in virtue of which the bishops,

who, appointed by the Holy Spirit [Acts 20:28], have succeeded to the place of

the Apostles as true pastors, feed and rule their several flocks, each the one

which has been assigned to him: that power is rather maintained, confirmed and

defended by the supreme pastor" (Enchir., n. 1828). It is without doubt true that

St. Gregory repudiated in strong terms the title of universal bishop, and relates

that St. Leo rejected it when it was offered him by the fathers of Chalcedon. But,

as he used it, it has a different signification from that with which it was employed

in the Vatican Council. St. Gregory understood it as involving the denial of the

authority of the local diocesan (Ep. 5:21). No one, he maintains, has a right so to

term himself universal bishop as to usurp that apostolically constituted power.

But he was himself a strenuous asserter of that immediate jurisdiction over all

the faithful which is signified by this title as used in the Vatican Decree. Thus he

reverses (Ep. 6:15) a sentence passed on a priest by Patriarch John of

Constantinople, an act which itself involves a claim to universal authority, and

explicitly states that the Church of Constantinople is subject to the Apostolic

See (Ep. 9:12). The title of universal bishop occurs as early as the eighth

century; and in 1413 the faculty of Paris rejected the proposition of John Hus that

the pope was not universal bishop (Natalis Alexander, 'Hist. eccl.", saec. XV and

XVI, c. ii, art. 3, n. 6)

(3) The Right of Entertaining Appeals in All Ecclesiastical Causes

The Council goes on to affirm that the pope is the supreme judge of the faithful,

and that to him appeal may be made in all ecclesiastical causes. The right of

appeal follows as a necessary corollary from the doctrine of the primacy. If the

pope really possesses a supreme jurisdiction over the Church, every other

authority, whether episcopal or synodal, being subject to him, there must of

necessity be an appeal to him from all inferior tribunals. This question, however,

has been the subject of much controversy. The Gallican divines de Marca and

Quesnel, and in Germany Febronius, sought to show that the right of appeal to

the pope was a mere concession derived from ecclesiastical canons, and that

the influence of the pseudo-Isidorean decretals had led to many unjustifiable

exaggerations in the papal claims. The arguments of these writers are at the

present day employed by frankly anti-Catholic controversialists with a view to

showing that the whole primacy is a merely human institution. It is contended

that the right of appeal was first granted at Sardica (343), and that each step of

its subsequent development can be traced. History, however, renders it

abundantly clear that the right of appeal had been known from primitive times,

and that the purpose of the Sardican canons was merely to give conciliar

ratification to an already existing usage. It will be convenient to speak first of the

Sardican question, and then to examine the evidence as regards previous

practice.

In the years immediately preceding Sardica, St. Athanasius had appealed to

Rome against the decision of the Council of Tyre (335). Pope Julius had annulled

the action of that council, and had restored Athanasius and Marcellus of Ancyra

to their sees. The Eusebians, however, had contested his right to call a conciliar

decision in question. The fathers who met at Sardica, and who included the most

eminent of the orthodox party from East and West alike, desired by their decrees

to affirm this right, and to establish a canonical mode of procedure for such

appeals. The principal provisions of the canons which deal with this matter are:

that a bishop condemned by the bishops of his province may appeal to

the pope either on his own initiative or through his judges;

that if the pope entertains the appeal he shall appoint a court of second

instance drawn from the bishops of the neighbouring provinces; he may, if

he thinks fit, send judges to sit with the bishops.

There is nothing whatever to suggest that new privileges are being conferred. St.

Julius had recently, not merely exercised the right of hearing appeals in the most

formal manner, but had severely censured the Eusebians for neglecting to

respect the supreme judicial rights of the Roman See: "for", he writes, "if they

[Athanasius and Marcellus] really did some wrong, as you say, the judgment

ought to have been given according to the ecclesiastical canon and not thus....

Do you not know that this has been the custom first to write to us, and then for

that which is just to be defined from hence?" (Athanasius, "Apol." 35) . Nor is

there the smallest ground for the assertion that the pope's action is hedged in

within narrow limits, on the ground that no more is permitted than that he should

order a re-hearing to take place on the spot. The fathers in no way disputed the

pope's right to hear the case at Rome. But their object was to deprive the

Eusebians of the facile excuse that it was idle for appeals to be carried to Rome,

since there the requisite evidence could not be forthcoming. They therefore

provided a canonical procedure which should not be open to that objection.

Having thus shown that there is no ground for the assertion that the right of

appeal was first granted at Sardica, we may now consider the evidence for its

existence in earlier times. The records of the second century are so scanty as to

throw but little light on the subject. Yet it would seem that Montanus, Prisca, and

Maximilla appealed to Rome against the decision of the Phrygian bishops.

Tertullian (Con. Prax. 1), tells us that the pope at first acknowledged the

genuineness of their prophecies, and that thus "he was giving peace to the

Churches of Asia and Phrygia", when further information led him to recall the

letters of peace which he had issued. The fact that the pope's decision had

weight to decide the whole question of their orthodoxy is sufficiently significant.

But in St Cyprian's correspondence we find clear and unmistakable evidence of a

system of appeals. Basilides and Martial, the bishops of Leon and Merida in

Spain, had in the persecution accepted certificates of idolatry. They confessed

their guilt, and were in consequence deposed, other bishops being appointed to

the sees. In the hope of having themselves reinstated they appealed to Rome,

and succeeded, by misrepresenting the facts, in imposing on St. Stephen, who

ordered their restoration. It has been objected to the evidence drawn from this

incident, that St. Cyprian did not acknowledge the validity of the papal decision,

but exhorted the people of Leon and Merida to hold fast to the sentence of

deposition (Ep. 67:6). But the objection misses the point of St. Cyprian's letter.

In the case in question there was no room for a legitimate appeal, since the two

bishops had confessed. An acquittal obtained after spontaneous confession

could not be valid. It has further been urged that, in the case of Fortunatus (Ep.

59:10), Cyprian denies his right of appeal to Rome, and asserts the sufficiency of

the African tribunal. But here too the objection rests upon a misunderstanding.

Fortunatus had procured consecration as Bishop of Carthage from a heretical

bishop, and St. Cyprian asserts the competency of the local synod in his case

on the ground that he is no true bishop -- a mere pseudo-episcopus. Juridically

considered he is merely an insubordinate presbyter, and he must submit himself

to his own bishop. At that period the established custom denied the right of

appeal to the inferior clergy. On the other hand, the action of Fortunatus

indicates that he based his claim to bring the question of his status before the

pope on the ground that he was a legitimate bishop. Privatus of Lambese, the

heretical consecrator of Fortunatus who had previously been himself condemned

by a synod of ninety bishops (Ep. 59:10), had appealed to Rome without

success (Ep. 36:4).

The difficulties at Carthage which led to the Donatist schism provide us with

another instance. When the seventy Numidian bishops, who had condemned

Caecilian, invoked the aid of the emperor, the latter referred them to Rome, that

the case might be decided by Pope Miltiades (313). St. Augustine makes

frequent mention of the circumstances, and indicates plainly that he holds it to

have been Caecilian's undoubted right to claim a trial before the pope. He says

that Secundus should never have dared to condemn Caecilian when he declined

to submit his case to the African bishops, since he had the right "to reserve his

whole case to the judgment of other colleagues, especially to that of Apostolical

Churches" (Ep. 43:7). A little later (367) a council, held at Tyana in Asia Minor,

restored to his see Eustathius, bishop of that city, on no other ground than that

of a successful appeal to Rome. St. Basil (Ep. 263:3) tells us that they did not

know what test of orthodoxy Liberius had required. He brought a letter from the

pope demanding his restoration, and this was accepted as decisive by the

council It should be observed that there can be no question here of the pope

employing prerogatives conferred on him at Sardica, for he did not follow the

procedure there indicated. Indeed there is no good reason to believe that the

Sardican procedure ever came into use in either East or West. In 378 the

appellate jurisdiction of the pope received civil sanction from Emperor Gratian.

Any charge against a metropolitan was to come before the pope himself or a

court of bishops nominated by him, while all (Western) bishops had the right of

appeal from - their provincial synod to the pope (Mansi, III, 624). Similarly

Valentinian III in 445 assigned to the pope the right of evoking to Rome any

cause he should think fit (Cod. Theod. Novell., tit. 24, De episcoporum ordin.).

These ordinances were not, however, in any sense the source of the pope's

jurisdiction, which rested on Divine institution; they were civil sanctions enabling

the pope to avail himself of the civil machinery of the empire in discharging the

duties of his office. What Pope Nicholas I said of the synodal declarations

regarding the privileges of the Holy See holds good here also: "Ista privilegia huic

sanctae Ecclesiae a Christo donata, a synodis non donata, sed jam solummodo

venerata et celebrata" (These privileges bestowed by Christ on this Holy Church

have not been granted her by synods, but merely proclaimed and honoured by

them) ("Ep. ad Michaelem Imp." in P. L., CXIX, 948).

Much has been made by anti-Catholic writers of the famous letter "Optaremus",

addressed in 426 by the African bishops to Pope St. Celestine at the close of the

incident relating to the priest Apiarius. As the point is discussed in a special

article (APIARIUS OF SICCA), a brief reference will suffice here. Protestant

controversialists maintain that in this letter the African bishops positively

repudiate the claim of Rome to an appellate jurisdiction, the repudiation being

consequent on the fact that they had in 419 satisfied themselves that Pope

Zosimus was mistaken in claiming the authority of Nicaea for the Sardican

canons. This is an error. The letter, it is true, urges with some display of irritation

that it would be both more reasonable and more in harmony with the fifth Nicene

canon regarding the inferior clergy and the laity, if even episcopal cases were left

to the decision of the African synod. The pope's authority is nowhere denied, but

the sufficiency of the local tribunals is asserted. Indeed the right of the pope to

deal with episcopal cases was freely acknowledged by the African Church even

after it had been shown that the Sardican canons did not emanate from Nicaea.

Antony, Bishop of Fussala, prosecuted an appeal to Rome against St. Augustine

in 423, the appeal being supported by the Primate of Numidia (Ep. ccix).

Moreover, St. Augustine in his letter to Pope Celestine on this subject urges that

previous popes have dealt with similar cases in the same manner, sometimes by

independent decisions and sometimes by confirmation of the decisions locally

given (ipsa sede apostolica judicante vel aliorum judicata firmante), and that he

could cite examples either from ancient or from more recent times (Ep. 209:8).

These facts appear to be absolutely conclusive as to the traditional African

practice. That the letter "Optaremus" did not result in any change is evinced by a

letter of St. Leo's in 446, directing what is to be done in the case of a certain

Lupicinus who had appealed to him (Ep. 12:13). It is occasionally argued that if

the pope really possessed jure divino a supreme jurisdiction, the African bishops

would neither have raised any question in 419 as to whether the alleged canons

were authentic, nor again have in 426 requested the pope to take the Nicene

canon as the norm of his action. Those who reason in this way fail to see that,

where canons have been established prescribing the mode of procedure to be

followed in the Church, right reason demands that the supreme authority should

not alter them except for some grave cause, and, as long as they remain the

recognized law of the Church should observe them. The pope as God's vicar

must govern according to reason, not arbitrarily nor capriciously. This, however,

is a very different thing from saying, as did the Gallican divines, that the pope is

subject to the canons. He is not subject to them, because he is competent to

modify or to annul them when he holds this to be best for the Church.

IV. JURISDICTIONAL RIGHTS AND PREROGATIVES OF THE POPE

In virtue of his office as supreme teacher and ruler of the faithful, the chief control

of every department of the Church's life belongs to the pope. In this section the

rights and duties which thus fall to his lot will be briefly enumerated. It will appear

that, in regard to a considerable number of points, not merely the supreme

control, but the whole exercise of power is reserved to the Holy See, and is only

granted to others by express delegation. This system of reservation is possible,

since the pope is the universal source. of all ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Hence it

rests with him to determine in what measure he will confer jurisdiction on bishops

and other prelates.

(1) As the supreme teacher of the Church, whose it is to prescribe what is to be

believed by all the faithful, and to take measures for the preservation and the

propagation of the faith, the following are the rights which pertain to the pope:

it is his to set forth creeds, and to determine when and by whom an

explicit profession of faith shall be made (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. 24,

cc. 1 and 12);

it is his to prescribe and to command books for the religious instruction of

the faithful; thus, for example, Clement XIII has recommended the Roman

Catechism to all the bishops.

The pope alone can establish a university, possessing the status and

privileges of a canonically erected Catholic university;

to him also belongs the direction of Catholic missions throughout the

world; this charge is fulfilled through the Congregation of the Propaganda.

It is his to prohibit the reading of such books as are injurious to faith or

morals, and to determine the conditions on which certain classes of

books may be issued by Catholics;

his is the condemnation of given propositions as being either heretical or

deserving of some minor degree of censure, and lastly

he has the right to interpret authentically the natural law. Thus, it is his to

say what is lawful or unlawful in regard to social and family life, in regard

to the practice of usury, etc.

(2) With the pope's office of supreme teacher are closely connected his rights in

regard to the worship of God: for it is the law of prayer that fixes the law of belief.

In this sphere very much has been reserved to the sole regulation of the Holy

See. Thus

the pope alone can prescribe the liturgical services employed in the

Church. If a doubt should occur in regard to the ceremonial of the liturgy, a

bishop may not settle the point on his own authority, but must have

recourse to Rome. The Holy See likewise prescribes rules in regard to the

devotions used by the faithful, and in this way checks the growth of what

is novel and unauthorized.

At the present day the institution and abrogation of festivals which was till

a comparatively recent time free to all bishops as regards their own

dioceses, is reserved to Rome.

The solemn canonization of a saint is proper to the pope. Indeed it is

commonly held that this is an exercise of the papal infallibility.

Beatification and every permission for the public veneration of any of the

servants of God is likewise reserved to his decision.

He alone gives to anyone the privilege of a private chapel where Mass may

be said.

He dispenses the treasury of the Church, and the grant of plenary

indulgences is reserved to him. While he has no authority in regard to the

substantial rites of the sacraments, and is bound to preserve them as

they were given to the Church by Christ and His Apostles, certain powers

in their regard belong to him;

he can give to simple priests the Power to confirm, and to bless the oil of

the sick and the oil of catechumens, and

he can establish diriment and impedient impediments to matrimony.

(3) The legislative power of the pope carries with it the following rights:

he can legislate for the whole Church, with or without the assistance of a

general council;

if he legislates with the aid of a council it is his to convoke it, to preside,

to direct its deliberations, to confirm its acts.

He has full authority to interpret, alter, and abrogate both his own laws

and those established by his predecessors. He has the same plenitude of

power as they enjoyed, and stands in the same relation to their laws as to

those which he himself has decreed;

he can dispense individuals from the obligation of all purely ecclesiastical

laws, and can grant privileges and exemptions in their regard. In this

connexion may be mentioned

his power to dispense from vows where the greater glory of God renders it

desirable. Considerable powers of dispensation are granted to bishops,

and, in a restricted measure, also to priests; but there are some vows

reserved altogether to the Holy See.

(4) In virtue of his supreme judicial authority

causae majores are reserved to him. By this term are signified cases

dealing with matters of great moment, or those in which personages of

eminent dignity are concerned.

His appellate jurisdiction has been discussed in the previous section. It

should, however, be noted

that the pope has full right, should he see fit, to deal even with causae

minores in the first instance, and not merely by reason of an appeal

(Trent, Sess. XXIV; cap. 20). In what concerns punishment,

he can inflict censures either by judicial sentence or by general laws

which operate without need of such sentence.

He further reserves certain cases to his own tribunal. All cases of heresy

come before the Congregation of the Inquisition. A similar reservation

covers the cases in which a bishop or a reigning prince is the accused

party.

(5) As the supreme governor of the Church the pope has authority over all

appointments to its public offices. Thus

it is his to nominate to bishoprics, or, where the nomination has been

conceded to others, to give confirmation. Further, he alone can translate

bishops from one see to another, can accept their resignation, and can,

where grave cause exists, sentence to deprivation.

He can establish dioceses, and can annul a previously existing

arrangement in favour of a new one. Similarly, he alone can erect

cathedral and collegiate chapters.

He can approve new religious orders, and can, if he sees fit, exempt them

from the authority of local ordinaries.

Since his office of supreme ruler imposes on him the duty of enforcing the

canons, it is requisite that he should be kept informed as to the state of

the various dioceses. He may obtain this information by legates or by

summoning the bishops to Rome. At the present day this jus relationum

is exercised through the triennial visit ad limina required of all bishops.

This system was introduced by Sixtus V in 1585 (Constitution, "Rom.

Pontifex"), and confirmed by Benedict XIV in 1740 (Constitution, "Quod

Sancta") .

It is to be further observed that the pope's office of chief ruler of the Church

carries with it jure divino the right to free intercourse with the pastors and

the faithful. The placitum regium, by which this intercourse was limited

and impeded, was therefore an infringement of a sacred right, and as such

was solemnly condemned by the Vatican Council (Constitution, "Pastor

Aeternus", cap. iii). To the pope likewise belongs the supreme

administration of the goods of the Church.

He alone can, where there is just cause, alienate any considerable

quantity of such property. Thus, e.g., Julius III, at the time of the

restoration of religion in England under Queen Mary validated the title of

those laymen who had acquired Church lands during the spoliations of the

previous reigns.

The pope has further the right to impose taxes on the clergy and the

faithful for ecclesiastical purposes (cf. Trent, Sess. XXI, cap. iv de Ref.).

Though the power of the pope, as we have described it, is very great, it does not

follow that it is arbitrary and unrestricted. "The pope", as Cardinal Hergenröther

well says, "is circumscribed by the consciousness of the necessity of making a

righteous and beneficent use of the duties attached to his privileges....He is also

circumscribed by the spirit and practice of the Church, by the respect due to

General Councils and to ancient statutes and customs, by the rights of bishops,

by his relation with civil powers, by the traditional mild tone of government

indicated by the aim of the institution of the papacy -- to 'feed' -- and finally by the

respect indispensable in a spiritual power towards the spirit and mind of nations"

("Cath. Church and Christian State", tr., I, 197).

V. PRIMACY OF HONOUR: TITLES AND INSIGNIA

Certain titles and distinctive marks of honour are assigned to the pope alone;

these constitute what is termed his primacy of honour. These prerogatives are

not, as are his jurisdictional rights, attached jure divino to his office. They have

grown up in the course of history, and are consecrated by the usage of centuries;

yet they are not incapable of modification.

(1) Titles

The most noteworthy of the titles are Papa, Summus Pontifex, Pontifex

Maximus, Servus servorum Dei. The title pope (papa) was, as has been stated,

at one time employed with far more latitude. In the East it has always been used

to designate simple priests. In the Western Church, however, it seems from the

beginning to have been restricted to bishops (Tertullian, "De Pud." 13). It was

apparently in the fourth century that it began to become a distinctive title of the

Roman Pontiff. Pope Siricius (d. 398) seems so to use it (Ep. vi in P. L., XIII,

1164), and Ennodius of Pavia (d. 473) employs it still more clearly in this sense

in a letter to Pope Symmachus (P. L., LXIII, 69). Yet as late as the seventh

century St. Gall (d. 640) addresses Desiderius of Cahors as papa (P. L., LXXXVII,

265). Gregory VII finally prescribed that it should be confined to the successors

of Peter. The terms Pontifex Maximus, Summus Pontifex, were doubtless

originally employed with reference to the Jewish high-priest, whose place the

Christian bishops were regarded as holding each in his own diocese (I Clement

40). As regards the title Pontifex Maximus, especially in its application to the

pope, there was further a reminiscence of the dignity attached to that title in

pagan Rome. Tertullian, as has already been said, uses the phrase of Pope

Callistus. Though his words are ironical, they probably indicate that Catholics

already applied it to the pope. But here too the terms were once less narrowly

restricted in their use. Pontifex summus was used of the bishop of some notable

see in relation to those of less importance. Hilary of Arles (d. 449) is so styled by

Eucherius of Lyons (P. L., L, 773), and Lanfranc is termed "primas et pontifex

summus" by his biographer, Milo Crispin (P. L., CL, 10). Pope Nicholas I is

termed "summus pontifex et universalis papa" by his legate Arsenius (Hardouin,

"Conc.", V, 280), and subsequent examples are common. After the eleventh

century it appears to be only used of the popes. The phrase Servus servorum Dei

is now so entirely a papal title that a Bull in which it should be wanting would be

reckoned unauthentic. Yet this designation also was once applied to others.

Augustine (Ep. 217 a. d. Vitalem) entitles himself "servus Christi et per Ipsum

servus servorum Ipsius". Desiderius of Cahors made use of it (Thomassin,

"Ecclesiae nov. et vet. disc.", pt. I, I. I, c. iv, n. 4): so also did St. Boniface (740),

the apostle of Germany (P. L., LXXIX, 700). The first of the popes to adopt it was

seemingly Gregory I; he appears to have done co in contrast to the claim put

forward by the Patriarch of Constantinople to the title of universal bishop (P. L.,

LXXV, 87). The restriction of the term to the pope alone began in the ninth

century.

(2) Insignia and Marks of Honour

The pope is distinguished by the use of the tiara or triple crown. At what date the

custom of crowning the pope was introduced is unknown. It was certainly

previous to the forged donation of Constantine, which dates from the

commencement of the ninth century, for mention is there made of the pope's

coronation. The triple crown is of much later origin. The pope moreover does not,

like ordinary bishops, use the bent pastoral staff, but only the erect cross. This

custom was introduced before the reign of Innocent III (1198-1216) (cap. un. X de

sacra unctione, I, 15). He further uses the pallium at all ecclesiastical functions,

and not under the same restrictions as do the archbishops on whom he has

conferred it. The kissing of the pope's foot -- the characteristic act of reverence

by which all the faithful do honour to him as the vicar of Christ -- is found as early

as the eighth century. We read that Emperor Justinian II paid this respect to

Pope Constantine (708-16) (Anastasius Bibl. in P. L., CXXVIII 949). Even at an

earlier date Emperor Justin had prostrated himself before Pope John I (523-6; op.

cit., 515), and Justinian I before Agapetus (535-6; op. cit., 551). The pope, it may

be added, ranks as the first of Christian princes, and in Catholic countries his

ambassadors have precedence over other members of the diplomatic body.

(For the full list of men who have held this office, see LIST OF POPES.)

G. H. Joyce

Transcribed by Gerard Haffner

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XII

Nihil Obstat, June 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor

Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.org